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Preface
The National Climate Change Research Facility (NCCARF) is undertaking a program of 
Synthesis and Integrative Research to synthesise existing and emerging national and 
international research on climate change impacts and adaptation. The purpose of this 
program is to provide decision-makers with information they need to manage the risks of 
climate change. 
This report on Cyclone Tracy forms part of a series of studies/reports commissioned by 
NCCARF that look at historical extreme weather events, their impacts and subsequent 
adaptations. These studies examine particular events – primarily extremes – and seek to 
explore prior vulnerabilities and resilience, the character and management of the event, 
subsequent adaptation and the effects on present-day vulnerability. The reports should inform 
thinking about adapting to climate change – capacity to adapt, barriers to adaptation and 
translating capacity into action. While it is recognised that the comparison is not and never 
can be exact, the over-arching goal is to better understand the requirements of successful 
adaptation to future climate change. 
This report highlights Cyclone Tracy, which was a Category 4 cyclone that laid waste to the 
city of Darwin in the Northern Territory early on Christmas Day in 1974. Cyclone Tracy 
showed the nation just how devastating the impact of a cyclone could be, and awoke the 
engineering community – local and international – to the true risk of cyclonic wind storms. 
Tracy’s small size minimised the spatial extent of damage, but her slow forward speed meant 
the areas beneath her storm track were completely devastated. Cyclone Tracy resulted in 71 
deaths and 650 injuries. Fortunately for Darwin, flooding and storm surge were not major 
issues, or these numbers could have been far higher. In almost all cases, wind was the 
dominant factor in the ensuing structural damage, which left 94 per cent of housing 
uninhabitable and approximately 40 000 people homeless, and necessitated the evacuation of 
80 per cent of the city’s residents. 
Other reports in the series are: 
• East Coast Lows and the Newcastle-Central Coast Pasha Bulker Storm 
• The 2008 Floods in Queensland: Charleville and Mackay 
• Storm Tides along East Coast Australia 
• Heatwaves: The Southern Australian Experience of 2009 
• Drought and the Future of Rural Communities: Drought Impacts and Adaptation in 
Regional Victoria, Australia 
• Drought and Water Security: Kalgoorlie and Broken Hill 
To highlight common learnings from all the case studies, a Synthesis Report has been 
produced, which is a summary of responses and lessons learned. 
All reports are available from the website at www.nccarf.edu.au. 
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Executive summary 
Key findings 
1. The improved wind performance mandated in the construction of residential homes in 
cyclone-prone areas has proved effective, although there are concerns that decay 
and corrosion over time will reduce their performance under extreme wind loads. 
2. Around the world, disaster losses from meteorological events are increasing and, to 
this point in time, these increases can be attributed to demographic changes – more 
people living in dangerous places with more to lose. 
3. Global climate change may alter the frequency and intensity of future cyclonic activity, 
but the exact nature of these changes remains a difficult and as yet unsolved 
research question. 
4. From public safety and policy perspectives, the most effective response to extreme 
winds, whatever their origin, is better building codes. 
5. Evacuation should become a secondary consideration and, provided surge is not an 
issue, the primary focus during cyclonic events should be to ensure people are safely 
inside their homes or workplaces.  
6. The desired level of wind performance of structures will always be a compromise 
between the likelihood of extreme winds and the cost of implementing the engineering 
improvements.  
7. It is always possible for the design wind speeds to be exceeded and building failure to 
result, even if the code is scrupulously complied with. 
 
Recommendations
1. Implementation of a lifetime inspection and maintenance program for buildings in 
cyclone regions should be considered. These inspections could be carried out at 
predefined times during a building’s life, or be implemented as mandated structural 
inspections at the point of sale. 
2. Funding of a regular (approximately five yearly) review of cyclonic wind speed utilising 
up-to-date observational data and modelling techniques. These studies should report 
point and area location risks. 
The National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) has engaged Risk 
Frontiers to investigate the adaptive capacity of the Australian building industry using the 
changes made in light of Tropical Cyclone Tracy as a case in point. This goal was achieved by 
a review of historic reports, data sets, books and scientific journals, and through interview 
sessions with significant figures in the adaptive process. The capacity of emergency 
management and insurance industries for adaptation is also briefly addressed in the 
appendixes to this report.  
Cyclone Tracy 
Tropical Cyclone Tracy laid waste to the city of Darwin early on Christmas morning in 1974. 
Tracy was a small but intense cyclone with observed wind gusts up to 217 km/h (60 m/s), and 
predicted storm maximum wind gusts up to 20 per cent greater. At the time, the gust of 217 
km/h was the highest such wind speed ever recorded on mainland Australia. Tracy’s small 
size minimised the spatial extent of damage, but the cyclone’s slow translational speed meant 
the areas damaged were completely devastated. Cyclone Tracy showed the engineering 
community that the magnitude and duration of cyclonic winds could be greater than anyone 
had previously thought possible, and awoke the community – local and international – to the 
true risk of cyclonic wind storms. Cyclone Tracy resulted in 71 deaths and 650 injuries; 
2 Historical Case Studies of Extreme Events 
fortunately for Darwin, flooding and storm surge were not major issues or this number could 
have been far greater. In almost all cases, wind was the dominant factor in the ensuing 
structural damage, and thus is the primary focus of this work.  
Damage 
After the cyclone passed, approximately 60 per cent of Darwin’s houses were destroyed 
beyond repair, with only 6 per cent considered immediately habitable. Of the damaged homes, 
high-set houses performed worse than their low-set counterparts, with differences being 
driven by a lower level of structural redundancy built into the houses’ framing systems. This 
was particularly prevalent in the newer (i.e. post-Cyclone Althea – 24 December 1971) 
housing, where a larger portion of a home’s bracing resistance was required of the cladding 
system – which, in most cases, was lost relatively early or destroyed through impact of flying 
debris. Loss of roof cladding through fatiguing and its subsequent contribution to flying debris 
was a significant feature of the observed damage during Tracy. The destruction of large 
amounts of unreinforced masonry walling, and the enhanced damage generated by not 
accounting for rapid internal pressurisation, were also clearly highlighted.  
The fact that the newer homes performed so poorly was a surprise to all, given that their 
design incorporated engineering lessons from the damage to Townsville after Cyclone Althea 
in December 1971.  
Larger engineered structures in Darwin performed considerably better than housing, with the 
proportion of buildings completely destroyed dropping to around 20 per cent. Although these 
structures performed similarly in respect of maintaining cladding, their overall improved 
performance occurred because a suitable level of redundancy was built into them by the 
engineers who were legally required to design these structures. For the engineered buildings 
that did fail, it was generally found that engineering standards performed adequately, though it 
was evident that ambiguity in the wording of the standards led to the inappropriate application 
of some design specifications. An example of this was the ability for a designer to continue to 
rely on foliage for shielding at wind speeds that would blow the trees over. Some deficiencies 
in technical specifications were also found, with the hitherto unrecognised contribution of 
dynamic loading due to fluctuations in the wind probably being the most prominent. 
The overall damage to structures left approximately 40 000 people homeless, and 
necessitated an evacuation of 80 per cent of the city’s residents. Had structures performed 
better, the size of or necessity for this evacuation could have been reduced. 
Response
The responsibility for the devastation that beset Darwin largely lay with those responsible for 
the construction of the city’s buildings, which failed so spectacularly. The ensuing human 
catastrophe and evacuation all stemmed from the fact that the places people went to for 
shelter during and after the storm were not resilient enough to withstand cyclonic winds. 
Cyclone Tracy was therefore an engineering failure, and required an engineering response. 
Questions also needed to be answered as to why buildings failed in the ways they did, and 
any major reconstruction was pointless until these questions were answered. A moratorium 
was swiftly put on all rebuilding so that this could be done.  
In the immediate aftermath of Tracy, engineers analysed most of the failed structures, 
determined general failure mechanisms, and developed interim – though conservative – 
design recommendations so reconstruction could begin. This process took less than three 
months to be achieved, with the first housing begun in six and the first reconstructed homes 
completed within a year. Taking a year to complete the first of the reconstructed homes could 
be perceived as inadequate, but the engineering input required to determine previously 
unknown failure mechanisms, develop and codify new testing and construction techniques, re-
educate builders, inspectors and certifiers, and then actually build the homes, warranted this 
timeframe. The improved building standards were applied to large structures and housing 
alike, and – at least for the reconstruction phase – a certified engineer was required to 
approve all building designs. This was a huge step for a housing construction industry that 
typically had relied largely on a builder’s experience to determine the most appropriate 
method of construction. The use of engineers and engineering principles for the construction 
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of residential housing highlighted the adaptive capacity of both the engineering and building 
communities, and resulted in a step change in the safety afforded by these structures. 
Housing was now considered to be a level of importance comparable with larger buildings, 
and it was no longer acceptable to suggest that the low cost of housing justified an unscientific 
approach to its design, based on the fact that it could be replaced easily and cheaply in the 
event of failure. The human toll of this occurrence was shown to be too great. After all, 
housing was where the majority of the city’s population sheltered during Tracy, and to ensure 
their future safety, these buildings had to be constructed with extreme events in mind. 
The changes – particularly to housing construction – were at the time radical, but the national 
horror at the damage to Darwin meant the social and political will was right for such changes 
to be made, irrespective of any resistance by industry. Outside of a post-disaster timeframe, 
the extent and rapid implementation of such significant changes would have been impossible. 
With the passage of time, new research has allowed refinement of the recommended design 
and construction methods, and these eventually made their way into national building 
standards and to other cyclone-prone regions of the country (though some were using them 
well before they were found in the standards). Because of the new rational (i.e. engineering 
based) approach to housing design, it was found that many of the post-Tracy 
recommendations were equally applicable to non-cyclone regions, and through the newly 
developed wind loading standard for housing, were applied in these regions as well. In 
principle, every home now built in Australia encompasses lessons learnt from Cyclone Tracy 
(Walker 2008). 
Lessons 
One of the clearest lessons learnt from the damage caused by Cyclone Tracy was that 
buildings with engineering input into their design and construction performed considerably 
better than those without. It was clear that the housing design and construction process had to 
be changed to incorporate these principles so their overall resilience could be enhanced. The 
introduction of engineering-based standards for the design of housing was the result of this, 
and the significantly improved resilience of housing – and not just in cyclone regions – is a 
continuing legacy of Cyclone Tracy. At the time, engineering input into housing construction 
was a radical concept, and its implementation required a change of thinking and attitude by 
both the engineering and building communities. The public horror at the devastation allowed 
these attitudes to change, and quickly. 
Several important technical lessons were learnt from the damage to Darwin, with some of the 
most significant being: 
x Wind loading is dynamic, not static, and engineering tests aimed at ensuring durability 
during cyclonic winds must reflect this. This point was most poignantly displayed by 
the loss of roof sheeting. 
x During severe cyclones, flying debris can be significant, and design for its impact 
must be considered. 
x During severe cyclones, vegetation cannot be relied upon to provide significant 
shielding. 
x In an environment where flying debris is common, so too will be the occurrence of 
internal pressurisation. This must be allowed for. 
Gradually, these changes were introduced into design standards, but engineering 
researchers, consulting engineers and government-based engineering/construction bodies 
ensured their inclusion into general engineering practice well before this time. This was 
achieved faster in regions such as Townsville where Althea was still fresh in local memory.  
Tracy also highlighted the problems of using a design approach based on the everyday 
performance of a structure (i.e. permissible stress design), and showed how accounting for 
extreme events, such as the limit state design approach, was essential. Although Cyclone 
Tracy didn’t initiate the shift from a permissible stress to limit state design approach, it clearly 
showed that not considering the most devastating events in regions prone to low-frequency, 
high-impact events was inappropriate. Philosophically, this lesson also pointed out why the 
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then current housing construction process of trial and error was always doomed to be found 
wanting. 
What impact have changes made? 
To investigate the impact of improvements made to the wind-resistant design method, two 
studies that aimed at predicting present-day losses if Tracy were to recur were reviewed. In 
all, it is suggested that, in the event of recurrence, the average per-structure damage would 
be reduced by up to 85 per cent. This, importantly, represents a reduction in damage to a 
level that would no longer necessitate an evacuation. This would greatly reduce the monetary 
and sociological impact of the recurrence of a similar event. If factors such as structural 
degradation and inherent human error are considered, and the above improvements were not 
achieved, it is still felt that damage would be comparatively minimal. 
What more can be done? 
Despite the positive changes made, there are still issues with building methods that may 
increase the risk of failure under extreme wind conditions unnecessarily. The following are 
some of the recommendations made for minimising this risk: 
x regular reanalysis of design wind speeds in cyclone prone regions using the most up-
to-date information and techniques 
x improved understanding and design for durability of structural elements 
x collection of more cyclonic wind speed measurements 
x better compatibility between design standards, and 
x review of the building inspection process. 
Many of the issues needing to be addressed can be handled by research institutions, but 
significantly greater funding is required above what which currently exists. Non-traditional 
sources of funding – that is, through private industry – should also be explored to fulfil this 
need. Issues with coordinating and running Standards however, require bodies such as 
Engineers Australia or the Australian Building Codes Board to play an integral role. Issues 
with building inspections must be addressed by state governing bodies that ultimately legislate 
the process.  
Despite these comments, adaptive processes made in light of Cyclone Tracy have led to the 
development of a world-leading, wind-resistant design practice in this country. 
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1. Introduction 
On Christmas morning 1974, Tropical Cyclone Tracy devastated the city of Darwin, causing 
unprecedented damage to buildings, communication networks and city infrastructure. The 
event and subsequent reconstruction of essential facilities uprooted an entire community and 
redefined the way Australians, if not the world, considered the potential impact of natural 
disasters. A total of 71 people lost their lives, with a further 650 hospitalised or injured. 
According to the Insurance Council of Australia’s Disaster Statistics (Insurance Council of 
Australia 2009), the total insured loss from Cyclone Tracy was A$200 million (in 1974 dollars) 
which, normalised to current values, is shown to be the most costly meteorological disaster to 
ever impact Australia (Crompton & McAneney 2008). On top of more tangible monetary 
losses, the immediate and prolonged evacuation of 35 000 residents – approximately 75 per 
cent of the city’s pre-Tracy population – caused significant and lasting psychological damage 
to many residents.  
Following an event such as Cyclone Tracy, it is important that everything be done to learn 
from the lessons that nature inflicts so the risk to life and amenity can be minimised for future 
events. Once these lessons are identified, it is then essential that improved policy and 
regulations be implemented in order to mitigate the risk. Fortunately, in the case of Tracy and 
its impact on standardisation of wind-resistant building design, swift and thorough assessment 
was made in the immediate aftermath of the storm, and it is upon this information that a large 
part of the last three decades of this country’s cyclonic wind resistant building regulations has 
been based. In many ways, the industry’s response to Tracy is a clear example of a 
successful adaptation to a catastrophe.  
This report uses Tropical Cyclone Tracy as a case study to investigate adaptive capacity in 
the aftermath of a disaster. In this, the first of two reports on Tracy, the primary focus is on the 
building industry, but the impacts upon the insurance industry will also briefly be explored, with 
specific reference to wind dominant cyclonic events. The use of building regulations as a 
means of enforcing specified design standards is explored extensively. A second report will 
consider the human dimension of the impact of Cyclone Tracy, and in particular what 
happened to the Indigenous communities affected by Tracy. This second report is due for 
completion in late 2011. 
In considering the engineering and industry response to Tracy, this report considers the 
following specific questions:  
x What deficiencies/strengths were highlighted by the disaster?  
x How did the responsible bodies deal with these issues in the short term?  
x How did these same bodies adapt in the long term?  
x Have these changes served to strengthen resilience for future windstorm disasters?  
Official reports, damage assessments, eyewitness accounts and peer-reviewed literature are 
all used to piece together the events precipitated by Cyclone Tracy and the ensuing response. 
These works are supplemented by interviews with key persons involved in Tracy’s damage 
assessment and the subsequent rewriting of codes of practice. 
The report begins with a description of the event that was Tropical Cyclone Tracy. In the next 
section, a background to the city of Darwin, its climatology, and a description of societal 
factors are important for an understanding of some pre-existing conditions that influenced the 
impact of and response to Cyclone Tracy. Section 3333 is rounded out by descriptions of the 
type of buildings as well as the standards/codes used for their construction in Darwin prior to 
Tracy. Section 4 follows with the observations and statistical results of two damage surveys 
conducted shortly after the event. Engineering explanations for failures of each type of 
construction are discussed with weaknesses in construction practice or design standards 
highlighted. Changes to building codes and standards made because of Tracy’s damage and 
the subsequent lessons to be learnt from these processes are discussed in Section 5555. The 
report concludes with the assessment of two modelling studies aimed at investigating the 
usefulness of changes made to the building standards.  
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It should be stated from the outset that this report concentrates almost solely on the impact of 
wind damage, and on its implications for wind-resistant design. Tropical cyclones may inflict 
damage because of strong winds, heavy rains or storm surge, and in some cases all three 
could be implicated. In the case of Cyclone Tracy, however, wind alone was largely 
responsible for the observed damage, and it is therefore this element that is the focus of our 
report. This is not to imply that wind is more dangerous than the other variables, or that it 
presents a greater risk to Darwin than the other two factors in future events, but given their 
absence during Tracy, the available lessons were limited.  
2. Cyclone Tracy 
2.1 Chronology 
Early on 20 December 1974, a large cloud mass developed in the Arafura Sea, approximately 
700 km north-east of Darwin. The cumulonimbus structure was part of a fragmenting 
intertropical convergence zone (ITCZ) cloud structure that formed a continuous 60° band the 
previous day. The 0930 CST (all times are given in local Central Standard Time) surface 
pressure analysis showed a developing tropical low embedded in the doldrum trough, the 
precursor to Cyclone Tracy.  
The low-pressure system moved slowly southwest, and by 4 pm on 21 December the first 
tropical cyclone alert was issued, advising of the possibility of tropical cyclone development. 
At 9.30 pm, based on spiralling cloud formations visible on infrared satellite photographs, it 
was decided that a tropical cyclone had formed and the first official warning was issued at 10 
pm with the name Tracy assigned.  
On 22 December, satellite images showed rapid signs of development, with the first echoes of 
an eye wall observed between 10.30 am and 1.30 pm. By 3.30 pm, the eye wall had clearly 
developed and had a diameter of 37 km. The eye was now located approximately 200 km 
north of Darwin, and was still moving slowly on a south-west track. 
At 7.30 am on 23 December, Tracy’s eye had shrunk to only 12 km and was located off the 
northern tip of Melville Island. For the remainder of the day, moderate winds and heavy rain 
were recorded on the island as Tracy continued on a south-westerly path. At midnight, 
however, as Tracy passed the tip of Bathurst Island, radar observations showed a change of 
track southward. This and subsequent changes are linked to the onset of monsoon westerlies 
initiated over Indonesia (Davidson 2002). 
By early on 24 December, mean wind speeds of over 100 km/h were being recorded at Cape 
Fourcroy on Bathurst Island’s western tip. As the morning wore on, recorded wind speeds 
continued to intensify to a maximum mean wind speed of 120 km/h as the eye moved to within 
20 km of the anemometer station. By midday, Tracy’s path had again changed and was now 
heading south-east towards Darwin. At 12.30 pm a Flash Cyclone Warning was issued, 
advising of expected landfall early the following morning. 
Before 1 am on 25 December, wind gusts of over 100 km/h were being recorded at Darwin 
airport. After 1 am, reports of damage began filtering into the Bureau of Meteorology’s 
Tropical Cyclone Warning Centre, but by 3 am lines of communication were lost as both radio 
stations failed. At 3.05 am, a wind gust of 217 km/h was recorded by the airport anemometer; 
this was shortly before, and prior to the passage of the storm’s maximum wind speeds, it was 
destroyed by wind-borne debris. At 3.50 am, the eye passed directly over the Darwin airport 
and a period of calm ensued for 35 minutes. At 4.35 am, the calm at the airport ended and 
winds believed to be of greater intensity began from the opposite direction. This ‘second’ wind 
caused the radar to fail at 4.30 am. Tracy continued to move inland in an easterly direction, 
and began to decay rapidly; the further inland it moved the weaker it became. By 6.30 am, 
winds were abating in the Darwin area, and at 11 am winds recorded at Middle Point showed 
signs of weakening. After midday, Tracy degenerated into a rain depression and continued to 
move in a south-easterly direction across the Northern Territory and into Western 
Queensland. 
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2.2 Cyclone characteristics 
Tracy’s track is depicted in Figure 1. It is evident that as Tracy passed Bathurst Island, its 
direction shifted approximately from south-west back to the south-east by a process known as 
recurvature. Tropical cyclones move because they are embedded in larger scale regions of 
moving air (Pielke & Pielke 1997). The intensity of the central pressure dictates the volume of 
atmosphere that influences this movement (Holland 1993), but generally middle and upper 
tropospheric winds ‘steer’ the cyclone in the general direction of their movement. For Tracy, 
the initial south-westerly movement was driven by a high-pressure system (anticyclone) sitting 
in the Gulf of Carpentaria. Recurvature occurred late on 23 December as upper tropospheric 
winds transported another anticyclone, initially off the west coast of Australia, over the 
Northern Territory, the north-west quadrant of which interacted with Tracy and reoriented its 
movement. As seen in Figure 1, though, the cyclone track does not follow a smooth path, and 
in fact for Cyclone Tracy a somewhat cyclic path occurred on both the pre- and post-
recurvature tracks. These oscillations about the mean steering flow direction are linked to eye 
wall thunderstorm dynamics, with the larger scale cyclonic system maintaining a smoother 
track. The earth’s rotation, outflow jets and the interaction between thunderstorms and the 
steering flow also play a role in determining the cyclone track (Pielke & Pielke 1997).  
As may be expected from this brief discussion, predicting cyclone tracks is complex, and is 
still not a precise science. Track uncertainty therefore plays an important role in the 
emergency management of tropical cyclones, because relatively sudden changes in cyclone 
direction close to land can significantly alter the impact they have on coastal communities and 
the need for evacuation or shelter.  
The recurvature of Tropical Cyclone Selma only a few weeks prior to Tracy caused something 
of a ‘false alarm’ when warnings were put out that Selma would impact Darwin only to see the 
cyclone suddenly reverse direction and cause no damage to the city. This instilled a sense of 
complacency in some of the residents of Darwin, and perhaps impacted their pre-cyclone 
preparation (Stretton 1976; McKay 2004). Pre-cyclone preparation was, however, undertaken 
by many residents. 
Imagery from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 4 satellite 
suggests that, after sustaining a central pressure of 950 hPa for over a day, Cyclone Tracy 
was at or near peak intensity as it made landfall at Darwin (Commonwealth Bureau of 
Meteorology 1977). The Dvorak (1975) technique estimates a maximum one-minute average 
wind speed of 189 km/h (52.5 m/s) at 10.18 pm on 23 December, and this speed was 
maintained for over 24 hours leading to landfall. Using a gust factor of 1.25 to convert from the 
mean to a gust wind speed, a maximum gust wind speed of 236 km/h (65.6 m/s) is predicted. 
This wind speed puts Tracy as a lower end Australian category 4 Severe Tropical Cyclone, or 
a category 3 Hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson scale when at maximum intensity. Greater 
maximum wind speeds have been suggested by some authors (e.g. Cook & Nicholls 2009); 
these estimates are discussed in the following section.  
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Source: C Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009. 
Figure 1: Path of Cyclone Tracy through Darwin  
The role of satellite imagery during Tracy was to track the cyclone direction and to make 
predictions of intensity. In modern times, the use of satellite imagery has improved 
significantly. It is now possible to measure surface wind speeds, precipitation type and 
intensity, three-dimensional cloud structure and sea surface temperature – all to a higher 
resolution than possible at the time of Tracy. 
As Cyclone Tracy moved closer to Darwin, the storm was tracked by local weather radar. This 
tracking continued until power was lost as the second winds hit early on 25 December. Radar 
information was used solely to observe the cyclone movement; however, subsequent analysis 
of images has allowed inference to be made with regard to storm structure, intensity and 
location of maximum winds. Although observed on the satellite images, what the radar 
highlighted was the extremely small size of Tracy, and with a main echo diameter of only 150 
km, it was much smaller than many other significant cyclones that had previously impacted, or 
would subsequently impact, the Australian coastline. This was also reflected in measurements 
of the cyclone eye, which varied from 10–12 km for the period prior to landfall after 
intensification (i.e. after rounding Bathurst Island), but contracted to about 8 km at landfall. 
This size is also considered extremely small. 
Averaged over time, and taken along the mean direction of the cyclone’s path, the forward 
speed of the cyclone was approximately 7 km/h with fluctuations between 5 and 9 km/hr. This 
relatively slow forward speed made the potential impact greater because it increased the time 
for which any fixed location would experience high winds. This had a significant impact on the 
wind loading of buildings, as the extended period of highly fluctuating wind load instigated 
fatiguing failure mechanisms not well understood or appreciated by the engineering 
community at the time. 
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2.3 Wind field 
As previously mentioned, the peak recorded wind speed during Cyclone Tracy was 217 km/h 
(60 m/s) at the Darwin Airport. This measurement was made only minutes prior to flying debris 
destroying the anemometer. Wind speeds were recorded using a Dines Anemometer 
designed and calibrated for wind speeds up to 240 km/h (67 m/s) with a response suitable for 
capturing three-second gusts. The anemometer was positioned at an elevation of 10 m and 
located in approximately the centre of the airport. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
wind speeds measured in this location are representative of Terrain Category 2 winds in the 
current, and all previous wind loading standards (Standards Australia 2002). Figure 2 shows 
the original Dines chart reading up to the time of failure, and is considered accurate to within 
5 km/h (1.4 m/s). The spike in wind speed at the time of failure is the by-product of an 
electrical failure and is not considered real.  
 
 
Figure 2: Dines anemograph from Darwin Airport – wind speed in knots 
 
The time of anemometer failure correlates well with the arrival of the cyclone eye wall and the 
location of probable maximum winds for the storm. Wind speeds prior to the arrival of the eye 
(approximately 3.50 am) are not expected to have been significantly, if at all, greater than the 
recorded maximum at the site of the anemometer. Wind speeds equivalent to that at the time 
of failure persisted for only five minutes after the failure. 
As the eye passed over Darwin and the so called second wind hit, several eyewitness reports 
suggest wind speeds were stronger than those prior to the eye (e.g. Walker 1975; McKay 
2004). This claim cannot be substantiated, and is largely based on the sound of winds and the 
level of destruction of buildings. Both these will naturally increase, and thus seem worse, as 
buildings begin to fail. Walker (1975) postulates that the increase could actually be a real 
effect and be due to either a decreased fetch roughness for the approach of the second wind 
or an intensification of the central pressure as the eye moved over the city. Walker puts more 
credibility in the first of these postulations, and highlights the similarity to reports of stronger 
second wind speeds for the 1897 event that traversed a similar path. Walker therefore 
suggests that a peak wind speed at the anemometer location of 240–260 km/h (67–72 m/s) is 
possible.  
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Typically for a translating cyclone system, some translational momentum is directly transferred 
to the wind field, increasing wind speeds to one side of the eye and causing an asymmetry in 
the wind field. In the case of cyclonically rotating storm moving in a roughly easterly direction, 
wind speeds therefore should increase to the north of the storm and decrease to the south 
with reference to an ideal symmetric stationary cyclone. Given the relatively slow forward 
speed of Tracy, this effect was not pronounced in the wind field, though the damage 
assessment, to be discussed in Section 4.34., shows that it does occur to some extent. As a 
result of this assessment, observed meteorological information, and corrections for 
topography and the frictional affect of surface roughness and terrain, Walker (1975) suggests 
a basic maximum wind speed field at an elevation of 10 m as given in Figure 3. An asymmetry 
is evident in the wind speed with respect to the eye, but it is not large. A similar distribution is 
noted by Leicester and Reardon (1976), based on a CSIRO damage assessment. What is 
evident is that wind speeds were high enough to cause significant damage in all parts of 
Darwin. 
2.4 Rainfall 
Rainfall intensity was measured at the Darwin Airport with a peak rate of 105 mm/h recorded 
in association with the initial eye wall passage between 2.45 am and 3.15 am. Rainfall was 
observed to drop to zero as the eye passed and the instrument failed with the incidence of the 
second wind. The estimated yield for the 24-hour period prior to 9 am on 25 December was 
280 mm, though exact magnitudes are uncertain given the propensity for rain gauges to 
systematically under-represent rainfall in high wind speed environments (Commonwealth 
Bureau of Meteorology 1977). Assuming the peak intensity of 105 mm/h is accurate, this 
represents a five- to ten-year return period rainfall event for Darwin (Pilgrim 1987). 
2.5 Storm surge 
Of the natural hazards associated with tropical cyclones – that is, rainfall (flood), wind and sea 
action (storm surge) – wind ranks third when it comes to the ability to wreak havoc on 
communities. The fact that flooding and storm surge were not significant issues for Darwin 
certainly saved scores of lives and prevented further damage to buildings. 
When strong low pressure systems move into the near-coast region, sea levels rise above the 
normal tide due to the reduction in atmospheric pressure at the storm’s centre. This process, 
combined with high ocean surface stresses from strong winds, is referred to as storm surge. 
When storm surge exceeds typical astronomical tide levels, low-lying coastal regions can be 
inundated and wind-driven wave action can impact on structures not typically accustomed to 
these loads. Life safety becomes significantly more difficult on occasions of significant storm 
surge.  
The height of storm surge is dependent on the characteristics and behaviour of the cyclone, 
wind strength and direction, as well as bathymetric features. For areas where the wind is 
blowing towards land, the wind drags the water towards the coast and elevates the local sea 
level. This process is called wind set-up, and is generally the principal cause of storm surge 
(Wilkinson 1975). A second important factor is the deep water wave height, which causes an 
increase in mean sea level as it breaks at the coast. This process is called wave set-up. A 
further issue influencing the elevation of storm surge is the tidal range of the location, and the 
time within this cycle that the cyclone makes landfall. In its simplest terms, the storm surge is 
superimposed upon the current tide, so if the cyclone makes landfall at high tide, the 
maximum surge height will be greater than if it occurred at low tide. 
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Source: After Walker (1975). 
Figure 3: Approximate maximum wind field. Gust wind speeds at 10 m height over open 
terrain.
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Fortunately for the residents of Darwin, Cyclone Tracy occurred during a period of neap tide 
(low tide of the lunar spring neap tide cycle). This meant that even though Tracy was 
associated with a high tide, the water level did not rise enough to be of concern to Darwin, 
which has an approximately 8 m tidal range. The Darwin Harbour tidal gauge measurement 
trace is shown in Figure 4 for 23–26 December. A maximum measured surge of only 1.6 m is 
shown through comparison of the measured and predicted tide levels. The surge in Fannie 
Bay was also indirectly measured to be between 1.7 and 2.0 m (Commonwealth Bureau of 
Meteorology 1977). However, because Darwin Harbour and Fannie Bay were to the south of 
Tracy’s eye, these measurements are not representative of the maximum surge associated 
with the cyclone, which occurred to the left of the cyclone path (north), at Casuarina beach, 
where both wind and wave set-up were unimpeded. Field inspections of the area suggest the 
maximum surge height was 4 m above the predicted tide level (Commonwealth Bureau of 
Meteorology 1977). Had Tracy not made landfall at neap tide, but at the highest astronomical 
tide, inundation to 3 m with 2 m waves could have been expected in lower lying coastal 
regions (Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology 1977). This would have caused further 
devastation to Darwin and posed significantly different emergency management issues. 
 
 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology (1977). 
Figure 4: Storm tide measured in Darwin Harbour. The difference between actual water 
level and predicted tide (in the absence of the cyclone) is due to the surge. 
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3. Pre-existing conditions: Why was Tracy so 
catastrophic? 
Darwin is located on the Timor Sea at the north-west tip of what today is the Northern 
Territory, Australia (Figure 5). At the time Tracy hit, however, Darwin was under 
Commonwealth jurisdiction and response to the cyclone officially fell to the hands of the 
federal government and the newly formed Natural Disaster Organisation (NDO), based in 
Canberra.  
Darwin is geographically isolated over 3000 km from any of Australia’s other capital cities, and 
has only one major highway in and out of the city. Logistically, this makes disaster recovery or 
evacuation complicated. In 1974, Darwin’s population was 46 700 (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2008) with at least 43 500 in the city at the time of Tracy (Northern Territory Library 
1998). The population of Darwin had grown rapidly in the 30 years since the Japanese 
bombings during World War II reduced it to only a few thousand. To accommodate the influx 
of population, new suburbs were built and Darwin expanded to the north of the airport with 
significant development taking place in the 1960s and early 1970s. The city of Darwin is built 
on a low bluff overlooking Darwin Harbour, with the outer suburbs generally flat with some 
isolated topographic features. To the north, the Tiwi Islands (Bathurst and Melville) protect 
Darwin from oncoming storms, possibly ameliorating some of the cyclone threat to the area. A 
map of Darwin in her Australian context is shown in Figure 5, with Figure 6 showing the 
distribution of the suburbs of Darwin in 1974. 
During the 1970s, Darwin was very much a government town, with 45 per cent of the labour 
force employed by the Commonwealth. Many of these government workers were on short-
term contracts and had no strong ties to the city (Stretton 1976). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Map of Australia showing location of Darwin 
Darwin 
14 Historical Case Studies of Extreme Events 
 
 
Figure 6: Darwin suburbs at the time of Tracy 
3.1 Climatology of Darwin 
Located at latitude 12° south, Darwin exhibits a tropical savannah climate, with distinct wet 
and dry seasons and a relatively uniform temperature year round. The majority of rainfall 
occurs between December and March. This is also the period associated with the occurrence 
of tropical cyclones in the region. 
Australia’s tropical cyclone season officially runs from 1 November to 30 April. Of the storms 
that form in Australian waters, approximately one passes within 200 km of Darwin each year. 
Prior to Tracy, at least six tropical cyclones are known to have severely affected Darwin 
communities. The most destructive of these early cyclones passed over Darwin on 7 January 
1897, most likely following a path similar to Tracy and with comparable wind speed and 
rainfall intensities (Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology 1977). This storm killed 28 people 
and the damage exceeded £150 000 in the currency of the time. In the 35 years since Tracy, 
a further seven cyclones have passed within 50 km of the city, but none has caused 
significant damage. 
To determine accurate Average Recurrence Intervals (ARI) for extreme events is exceedingly 
difficult, and due to short records, sampling errors are large. Nevertheless, using yearly gust 
wind speeds measured at Darwin Airport (without separating gust events), Whittingham 
(1964) used Extreme Value Analysis to show the maximum wind speed recorded during 
Cyclone Tracy (217 km/h, 60 m/s, see Section 2.32.3) had an average recurrence interval of 
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approximately 125 years. Using the then-new technique of synthetic storm track modelling, 
Martin (1975) also attempted to predict wind gust recurrence intervals for the Darwin region 
obtaining a result of 202 km/h (56 m/s) for the 100-year gust, a figure roughly in accord with 
Whittingham’s result (211 km/h, 59 m/s). This agreement was encouraging for the scientists 
and engineers of the day, and was seen as partial validation of the Extreme Value predictions 
despite their short record length. Note that throughout this document gust wind speed refers to 
a three-second gust, and the terms average recurrence interval, ARI, and return period are 
used interchangeably. The latter is a differentiation in nomenclature between meteorological 
and engineering communities and the former is based on the response time of the Dines 
anemometer historically used for recording gust wind speeds in this country. 
These values could be considered appropriate levels of calculable risk for Darwin at the time 
of Tracy; whether this risk was perceived by the community at large is, however, another issue 
(Li 2008). The level of risk was considered by the engineering community when writing 
building standards, but was not considered explicitly for the design and construction of 
residential homes, a point taken up in later discussion (Section 3.3). 
Today, the understood wind risk in Darwin is not much different, with a gust wind speed of 
213 km/h (59 m/s) prescribed as the 100-year return period wind gust in the current design 
standard for the region (Standards Australia 2002) (Figure 7). Some recent research suggests 
this may be too low, because the oceanic and tropospheric climate of Darwin could possibly 
lead to more severe events than historically observed (Cook and Nicholls 2009). This notion is 
in its scientific infancy, though, and its validity as applicable to Darwin is hotly debated (C 
Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009; J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 2009; G Walker, 
pers. comm., 28 October 2009). 
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Source: Standards Australia (2002). 
Figure 7: Average recurrence interval (ARI) for gust wind speeds at a point location in 
Darwin The upper limit is the maximum estimated wind speed estimated to have 
occurred at some point in the cyclone life, even though it did not necessarily impact 
Darwin. 
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3.2 Building stock 
In the early 1970s, Darwin consisted of approximately 8000 houses, 3000 flats and several 
hundred engineered non-residential and industrial structures. For government-built housing, 
three convenient structural categories could be applied (Department of Housing and 
Construction 1975):  
1. pre-1968 – Old Traditional 
2. 1968–72 – New Traditional, and 
3. 1972–74 – Houses with cyclone provisions. 
It is generally understood that private housing construction followed the trends of government 
homes, and therefore could be classified similarly (Department of Housing and Construction 
1975). Moreover, many privately owned homes were originally government owned. Walker 
(2004) and Haas (1976) suggest that the percentage of government-owned homes was 
approximately 40 per cent of the residential building stock at the time of Tracy. Privately 
owned homes tended to be older and were largely located in the southern parts of Darwin 
(south of the airport), with the newer northern suburb homes predominantly being 
government-owned and built (McKay 2004).  
Old Traditional homes were timber framed (4" × 2") nail construction with studded walls and 
inset diagonal timber bracing (a nomenclature of common construction members is shown in 
Figure 8). Roofing was bolted truss or orthodox framing construction with galvanised-iron 
sheeting and diagonal timber bracing. In many cases (approximately 60 per cent), 
construction was on an elevated timber platform, but apart from this feature was consistent 
with housing throughout Australia. For low-set construction, many homes utilised a traditional 
11” cavity brick wall with an anchored continuous reinforced concrete bond beam in place of 
the timber framing. New Traditional homes were structurally similar except for the use of 
gang-nails on trusses and triple-grips for the connection between purlin and truss (these strap 
type connectors replaced simple nail connections). Trusses became the dominant roofing 
system, but bracing between trusses was largely removed (Walker 1975), with roof sheeting 
assumed to resist this load. 3" × 2" studs replaced the larger 4" × 2" framing material 
previously used.  
Under-housing steel posts were replaced with concrete, and the under-floor unreinforced 
block work laundry or storeroom was assumed to provide the stabilising characteristics of the 
previously used tie bracing (Department of Housing and Construction 1975). Low-set housing 
of this vintage represented a move away from the cavity brick design and relied upon a timber 
frame, brickwork veneer-type construction. About a year before Tracy, however, many 
builders moved back to a cavity brick type method, though they began to use smaller bricks 
and larger cavity widths. These two newer low-set housing types performed considerably 
worse than the traditional 11” cavity construction. 
In 1971, Cyclone Althea went through Townsville in North Queensland. Investigation of 
damaged homes led to recommendations for increasing the cyclone resistance of houses, and 
these were scrupulously applied to homes built in Darwin after mid-1972. Some of the major 
recommendations from the Cyclone Althea damage assessment team were: 
x more appropriate use of cyclone bolts from roof truss to floor joists 
x use of screws in place of nails for fixing roofing material, with double fixings at eaves 
and ridges 
x purlin straps replaced triple grip connectors, and 
x timber bracing replaced by hoop-iron straps. 
Many of the homes built in the newer northern suburbs incorporated these considerations into 
their design and construction, and it was expected that these homes would display greater 
resilience to cyclonic winds than the previous two categories. This proved not to be the case, 
however. 
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Source: Australian Building Codes Board (2009). 
Figure 8: Nomenclature of common housing construction members 
 
By and large, houses were clad with either fibrous asbestos cement (fibro), approximately 60 
per cent, or brick, approximately 33 per cent. The remainder were a combination of fibro and 
brick, concrete or other specialised materials. Almost all elevated homes were externally clad 
with fibro, while brick was most popular cladding for low-set housing.  
Non-residential, generally engineered, buildings can be categorised as: 
x steel-framed (e.g. industrial buildings) 
x reinforced concrete (e.g. hotels, office), or 
x load-bearing brick (e.g. hotels, flats). 
There were significantly fewer ‘engineered’ buildings than houses in Darwin, but unlike 
houses, these structures were required to be built to a regulated Standard to resist cyclonic 
wind loads and to be certified by a structural engineer (see Section 3.3). The prescribed 
design wind speed given in the code was, however, less than that experienced by several of 
these structures during Tracy. 
Approximate dates of construction, on a suburb basis, are given in Figure 9. This figure 
graphically displays the general northward trend over time in development and, along with the 
data presented in this section, serves as an estimate proxy for the level of engineering input 
into the construction of homes in each particular area. Figure 10 shows the distribution of 
residential building types, with some indication of cladding material (e.g. fibrous asbestos 
cement or brick) where the information was available. 
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Figure 9: Approximate dates of construction for the suburbs of Darwin 
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Source: after Van der Sommen (2002). 
Note: EL BU signifies elevated buildings with the underneath built out, ELVTD signifies an elevated home, while 
G.L. signifies low-set or ground-level homes. 
Figure 10: Distribution of building type throughout Darwin 
3.3 Building standards and regulations 
Enforced building regulations can and are used as a disaster-mitigation tool by regulating 
bodies throughout Australia. By enforcing that structures be built to specified standards, a 
government, or its representative regulatory bodies, can ensure construction meets (to an 
acceptable level of risk) a series of life safety requirements. Prior to Tracy, design wind-
loading specifications were prescribed by each of the state and territory building agencies 
through a set of statewide building regulations. Some states, however, passed over many of 
their regulatory powers to the municipal councils, allowing them to enact their own building 
regulations by way of council by-laws (Australian Building Codes Board 2009). Some, though 
not all, of these powers were retracted following World War II. In Darwin during the early 
1970s, building regulations were embodied in the Northern Territory Building Manual, 
administered by the Northern Territory Building Board (Department of Housing and 
Construction 1975).  
In 1952, Australia’s first national wind loading standard was introduced, SAA Interim 350: 
Minimum Design Loads on Buildings, covering wind loading as a sub-section of the document. 
The introduction of this loading standard provided the first opportunity for regulatory bodies 
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nationwide to reference a single document for their loading specifications (Pham 2007). This 
was done in Darwin through the Building Manual for structures requiring engineering input into 
their design and construction. Prior to this time, designers were reliant on specifications in an 
appendix of the 1939 version of SAA CA1, the steel structures code of the time (Walker & 
Reardon 1987). The design philosophy adopted by these standards was that of working 
stress. What this meant was that for a specified design wind speed a structure must behave 
as it would under normal working conditions not being stressed or deflected excessively. 
Under the working stress approach, the design wind speed was set as the maximum 
statistically expected (64 per cent chance of exceedance) wind speed over the life of a 
structure. Factors of safety were then applied to design calculations, thus giving the structure 
considerably greater strength to account for the occurrence of extreme events.  
The specification of a design wind speed is an important step in the design process. This is 
the case for two reasons. First, the wind load is directly proportional to the square of the wind 
speed, thus any changes in this value can significantly influence the load a structure is 
designed to withstand. Second, it is through the design wind speed and its relationship with 
annual recurrence that governing bodies express the level of risk their constituents are 
expected to accept and finance.  
In the Interim 350 wind code, design wind speeds of 110 mph (49 m/s) for inland areas, and 
130 mph (58 m/s) for exposed regions of Darwin were given. These wind speeds were 
questioned as being too high by the Darwin branch of the Department of Housing and 
Construction, with the department’s Head Office suggesting housing with an expected 50-year 
life be designed for a wind speed of 110 mph (49 m/s) or 105 mph (47 m/s) if the expected life 
was 30 years. An additional drop in design wind speed to 100 mph (45 m/s) was allowed if the 
house was less than 20 ft (6 m) tall. In 1969, however, based on a series of wind tunnel tests, 
it was proposed that all elevated homes be designed for a wind speed of 110 mph (49 m/s) 
(Department of Housing and Construction 1975). On top of these winds, a factor of safety 
(1.22) was applied (in most cases) to account for the increased wind speeds of extreme 
events. 
Despite these specifications, it is apparent that – most likely due to the lack of legal obligation 
– none of the above criteria was actually used in the rational structural design of residential 
housing until the introduction of an updated Interim 350 in 1971 (Department of Housing and 
Construction 1975). This updated document was issued as Australian Standard CA34, and for 
the first time the document was divided into two parts with the wind loading standard 
published as an Australian Standard CA34 Part II – Wind Forces. This also signifies the 
introduction of ‘expert’ sub-committees for regulation of each of the loading hazards (e.g. 
wind, earthquake). In CA34, the design wind speed for Darwin was raised to 126 mph (56 
m/s), but the inclusion of terrain category reduction factors (which purport to account for the 
reduction in near-surface wind speed due to the presence of trees or other momentum-
absorbing surface features) allowed the design of homes in regions of wooded surrounds to 
be reduced by a factor of 0.7 to 88 mph (39 m/s). This is now known to be inappropriate given 
the level of defoliation intense winds instigate, but at the time this was not widely appreciated. 
Wind speeds specified in CA34 were directly related to the 50-year return period wind speed 
derived by a Gumbel analysis of historic records in a specific area. The limitations of using this 
approach, particularly in cyclone prone areas, were acknowledged, and a cyclone factor of 
1.15 was introduced as a factor of safety in these regions (50 km inland, north of 27°S, 
Appendix A). CA34 was metricated in 1973 and released as AS1170 part 2, with only minor 
revisions. 
Although 1972 saw the introduction of structural design concepts to residential housing, it was 
by necessity prescriptive and strictly the application of structural engineering ideas, not 
structural design. The same could be said for the recommendations made after Cyclone 
Althea (and applied in Darwin); these were engineering solutions to isolated problems but did 
not address the building as a whole, or develop a continual load path through the structure. In 
fact, up to the time of Tracy, the general practice in Darwin – and in fact the rest of Australia 
(and the world) – was for builders to construct homes based on skills obtained over years of 
experience and passed from builder to apprentice. No continued engineering of the house’s 
structural system was required due to the relatively low cost of housing, the high complexity of 
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its structural system, and the idea that homes possessed inherent strength beyond the 
understanding of structural engineers (Walker 2004).  
The trial and error approach in itself is not unreasonable when designing for events that occur 
relatively frequently, but for infrequent events such as tropical cyclones there is no opportunity 
for feedback to take into account the actions of extreme events that may happen only once, if 
at all, during a builder’s working life. Nonetheless, to say there was no engineering input into 
the design of houses is incorrect, as individual components (e.g. the fixing system for roofing 
material) were often tested by the manufacturer from which installation guidelines were 
developed and provided to a builder purchasing the product. There was, however, no 
regulation of these tests – or even a requirement for them to occur. Some local councils did 
have rudimentary requirements for approval of housing construction, but again these were 
based on the trial and error approach, and were by no means widely applied throughout the 
cyclonic regions of Australia.  
With these comments in mind, there were some construction rules by which the majority of 
built homes abided; these were the specifications set out by lending institutions as provisions 
for obtaining a loan. An example of this was the Commonwealth Bank’s Blue Book, which set 
out a series of prescriptive rules for all facets of housing construction with the concept of wind-
resistant design being but one of them. A typical requirement for construction in cyclone 
regions such as Darwin was the provision of enhanced tie-down when compared with non-
cyclonic regions. Many lending institutions had these types of rules, but they were only applied 
to those needing to borrow money, and the prescribed construction rules were not regulated 
by an engineering body.  
3.3.1 Development of a national building regulation framework 
Although not in use at the time, the Australian Model Uniform Building Code (AMUBC) was 
under development at the time of Tracy. The AMUBC was the first attempt to develop a 
nationwide building regulatory framework upon which all states could base their state and 
local building guidelines. This document was being written by the Interstate Standing 
Committee on Uniform Building Regulation (ISCUBR), a body created in 1965 for this 
purpose, and was in essence an agreement between the state administrations responsible for 
building regulatory matters to pool their resources for the benefit of all states (Australian 
Building Codes Board 2009). The AMUBC was not the same as a Standard, but called upon 
these documents, or provided technical and administrative guidelines (including inspections) 
as appropriate. At the time of Tracy, the AMUBC had no legal standing, but was the 
forerunner for the Building Code of Australia in use today, and was used as a building block 
for the Darwin Area Building Manual developed for Tracy’s reconstruction. 
3.3.2 Building certification 
In theory, inspections were required at certain critical points throughout construction of a 
building and permission granted for construction to continue. For housing, this was to be done 
by local council certifiers who typically had a carpentry background. In practice however, the 
number of notifications made were few, and not enough critical stages were defined 
(Department of Housing and Construction 1975). Often only one inspection was made where, 
if cladding had been installed, no inspection of connections (the most vulnerable component 
of construction) could be made (L Pham, pers. comm., 3 December 2009). In Darwin, 
because the DHC was in charge of most housing construction, one would expect the 
inspection process to have been better than for the remainder of the country. The lack of 
strictly regulated certification, though, was an issue which meant that even if technical 
regulations had been in place for housing construction, there would have been great difficulty 
in ensuring compliance. 
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4. Wind damage to buildings during Tracy 
The predominant cause of building failure in Darwin was through impact from the wind or 
objects propelled by the wind. The destruction in Darwin was then, and still is today, the worst 
meteorologically driven natural disaster to have impacted Australia (Crompton & McAneney 
2008); this observation is based on insurance industry payouts since credible recording began 
in 1967.  
Damage to buildings throughout Darwin was not uniform. Differences in building type, local 
topography and proximity to the cyclone eye played important roles in determining which 
buildings survived and which did not. Proximity to failed buildings was also an issue due to the 
domino effect that wind-borne debris can have on building damage. 
The general conclusion drawn from the series of damage assessments performed in the wake 
of Cyclone Tracy was that engineered buildings performed adequately in spite of wind speeds 
exceeding design levels, but non-engineered buildings such as residential dwellings 
performed unacceptably poorly (Walker 1975; Leicester & Reardon 1976). It was also found 
that the non-engineered residential housing in the northern suburbs performed considerably 
worse than those in the southern and central areas of Darwin, to a degree that increased wind 
speed alone cannot explain. The justification for these conclusions is outlined in this section. 
4.1 Damage surveys 
Two large-scale damage surveys were conducted in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone 
Tracy. The most widely cited of these is that commissioned by the Department of Housing and 
Construction (DHC) and the Darwin Reconstruction Commission, led by Dr George Walker, 
then of the James Cook University, North Queensland. This survey was conducted by teams 
of engineers whose primary objective was to ascertain the amount of accommodation 
immediately available and the location of houses that could most quickly be repaired (Walker 
1975). The survey was therefore, by necessity, relatively quick, with some questioning the 
validity of parts of the data set (Van der Sommen 2002). Notwithstanding this criticism, with 
more than 7300 of the estimated 8000 houses assessed in the survey, statistics from this 
work are extremely useful in assessing the performance of various categories of structures. 
The damage survey also assessed the performance of approximately 150 blocks of flats and a 
similar number of buildings with engineering input into their design. For each house, an 
assessment of the extent of damage to the roof, wall, floor and columns was made and 
recorded, along with the type of building, address and building ownership status. Based on 
this information, an overall assessment of the total percentage of buildings destroyed 
(presented as a ratio value termed here the damage ratio) was made. Damage ratios greater 
than approximately 0.6 meant the structure was effectively destroyed and would require 
complete rebuilding. Photos were taken of each building, and these are now stored at the 
Northern Territory Department of Infrastructure, Planning and the Environment.  
A second damage survey was conducted by the Commonwealth Scientific and Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) along 38 selected routes uniformly distributed through the built-up 
areas of Darwin (Leicester & Reardon 1976, 2008). The survey produced damage repair index 
data for approximately 2800 buildings, of which 1486 were timber-framed elevated houses, 
532 low-set brick houses, 127 fibrous asbestos cement sheet houses, approximately 300 non-
residential buildings and 200 light steel industrial buildings. During the survey, each building 
was assigned a damage class based on the worst observable damage feature and building 
type. From this information, a damage repair index, Equation (0.1), was assigned to signify the 
approximate repair cost of the structure. To associate the worst observed damage feature 
(Table 11) with a repair cost, the assumption was made that each building type (e.g. elevated 
with asbestos cement cladding) would follow a specific collapse sequence, thus implying a 
series of predictable failures had occurred. A damage repair index value of 0 signifies no 
damage and a value of 1 signifies either complete destruction or that it is not feasible to repair. 
The method of assigning damage repair indices is outlined for each building type in Appendix 
2. Throughout this report, damage class and not damage repair index is discussed, but the 
reader is directed to the tables in Appendix 2 to gain an appreciation of approximate repair 
costs. The routes followed by the CSIRO survey team are also given in Appendix 2. Although 
the extent of this survey is not as wide as the DHC survey, the choice of tracks ensured 
Adaptation Lessons from Cyclone Tracy 23 
 
surveyed data was representative of the building stock as a whole, and maintenance of similar 
exposure over each track length, meant results could largely be viewed as such. 
 
(0.1) 
 
Table 1: CSIRO survey damage classes 
Damage 
class
Worst damage feature  
(housing) 
Worst damage feature 
(steel industrial) 
1 Negligible Negligible 
2 Missile damage to cladding or 
windows 
Loss of half wall or half roof sheeting 
3 Loss of half roof sheeting Loss of all wall or all roof sheeting 
4 Loss of all roof sheeting Failure of non-load-bearing gable end wall 
5 Loss of roof structure Loss of all wall and all roof sheeting 
6 Loss of half walls Failure of load bearing gable end wall 
7 Loss of all walls Failure of some secondary structural 
members 
8 Loss of half floor (elevated only) Failure of some primary structural members 
9 Loss of all floor (elevated only) Total collapse of primary structure 
10 Collapse of floor support piers 
(elevated only) 
- 
 
4.2 Damage statistics and distributions 
As ascertained from Section 4.1, damage indices for the two surveys were not identical, but in 
principal are based on the same information – that is, the extent of destruction of particular 
buildings. Damage statistics for the DHC survey are shown in Figure 11 for the housing and 
engineered structures (Figure 11(a) and (b) respectively). Damage ratio data from the survey 
was recorded at 0.2 intervals – that is, 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0 – with the addition of a 0.1 level 
for those structures suffering only minor damage. For the sake of plotting consistency, the 0.1 
data is aggregated with the recorded 0.2 data.  
In Figure 11(a), housing is broken into three categories: elevated; elevated – built under 
(same as elevated but with the area under the home built out); and low-set. Survey results are 
shown as a damage ratio – that is, a percentage of the building destroyed as a fraction of total 
destruction (=1). What is immediately noticeable is that only about 1 per cent of housing 
escaped Tracy without some level of damage. Only about 6 per cent of homes (a subset of 
the 0.2 bar) were classified as intact except for minor damage to wall cladding or windows 
(Walker 2008). This meant that about 94 per cent of homes were considered uninhabitable in 
the immediate aftermath of Tracy, this being the catalyst that necessitated the large-scale 
evacuation of residents to other regions of the country.  
A second point of significance is the spike in damaged homes shown at a level of 0.8. This 
spike is driven by the poor performance of elevated homes, with almost complete failure as 
the dominant damage subset. Inspection of the survey records show that for elevated houses 
a damage value of 0.8 corresponds to the destruction of almost the entire roofing and wall 
structure, with only the flooring and columns remaining. When considering this with those 
assigned a value of 1 – that is, damage to support columns as well as all roofing and walls – 
the general propensity for elevated homes to reach almost complete destruction once damage 
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was initiated is clearly evident. More than 50 per cent of elevated homes lost almost all roofing 
and wall structure, with a further 15 per cent destroyed to such an extent that repair was 
considered unviable. This signifies a major failure of the home’s structural system and a lack 
of redundancy in its design. 
In comparison, low-set houses have a larger weighting of damage at the lower end of the 
damage scale, peaking at 0.2, and the relative frequency dropping off as the damage index 
increases. This trend was consistent for all low-set homes, irrespective of the cladding type. 
Approximately 40 per cent of low-set homes were, however, still considered destroyed – that 
is, 0.6 – but the larger proportion of homes at the lower end of the damage scale does 
suggest these structures may have exhibited greater resilience than the elevated homes. This 
comparison between (and within) housing types can only be strictly made after consideration 
of differences in terrain, topography, housing distribution or proximity to the cyclone eye, all of 
which will influence the true wind speed experienced by each individual home, a point to 
which we return in the following section. To a first approximation, though, the comparison 
made is considered reasonable.  
Compared with housing, the overall damage to buildings whose structure had been 
engineered was light (Walker 1975). The level of damage for these buildings is shown in 
Figure 11(b), along with the distribution of damage to flats. Although not all blocks of flats 
were strictly engineered, it is expected that many of the larger apartment blocks would have 
had some engineering input into their design. In contrast to statistics for housing, Figure 11(b) 
shows that a larger percentage of both flats (18 per cent) and commercial/industrial buildings 
(11 per cent) sustained only very minor damage – that is, a destroyed level of 0. Note, 
statistics for flats only relate to the top floor, as all other levels generally had little if any 
structural damage – damage to glass due to flying debris was, however, noted. The increase 
in the number of buildings surviving with only minimal damage likely implies a stronger overall 
cladding system, and thus a greater resistance to the impact of flying debris. In reality, this 
could have simply meant a reduction in the window area, instead of any major increase in the 
impact resistance of the cladding used in these structures. In saying this, however, the load-
bearing brick and sheet metal cladding used on many buildings did probably provide some 
enhanced protection.  
The damage distribution for the two categories of building is weighted more to the lower end 
of the damage scale, with flats showing a peak at 0.4 and commercial/industrial at 0.2. Both 
distributions drop steadily with increased damage. Comparing the number of destroyed 
buildings, (i.e. damage scale 0.6), with that of housing (60 per cent), a significant reduction is 
noted, with the flats (22 per cent) and commercial/industrial buildings (19 per cent) – that is, 
approximately one–third the level of housing damage. This reduction suggests not only an 
increase in structural strength of these building types, but also an increase in redundancy 
whereby even though 80–90 per cent of these structures suffered some form of damage, the 
buildings exhibited enough strength to avoid total collapse. This was not always the case, 
though, with Baker and Walker (1976) describing some types of steel-framed structures that 
performed poorly due to a lack of redundancy in their design. On a more positive note, the 
comparatively low number of engineered structures that suffered complete failure is 
encouraging given that the wind speeds experienced by many of these buildings was higher 
than that used in their design (Baker & Walker 1976). It is also a justification of the use of 
engineering input, as opposed to intuition and experience alone, in the design and 
construction of buildings. 
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(a) Damage statistics for houses  
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(b) Damage statistics for flats and engineered buildings 
 
Figure 11: Damage statistics for (a) residential houses and (b) flats and engineered 
buildings collected by the Department of Housing and Construction survey 
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For the CSIRO survey, Figure 12(a) and (b) shows damage statistics for houses and industrial 
buildings respectively. Unlike the DHC survey, CSIRO damage classes specify the worst 
observed damage, not a percentage of overall destruction. The general concept, however, is 
that the higher the damage class, the greater the level of damage to a building. The 
assumption required for assigning damage classes is that the damage described for all lower 
classes has occurred, thus implying a general damage sequence. A tabulated description of 
damage classes for both housing and industrial structures was given earlier in Table 1, the 
designation between the two required due to differing failure sequences. Despite the 
differences between DHC and CSIRO data formats, an attempt to relate the overall damage 
percentage (DHC) to damage classes (CSIRO) is made in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Approximate relationship between DHC and CSIRO survey data 
Damage 
class
Percentage destroyed 
(Housing) 
1 0 
2 0.1–0.2 
3 0.2–0.4 
4 0.4 
5 0.4 
6 0.6–0.8 
7 0.8–1.0 
8 1 (elevated) 
9 1 (elevated) 
10 1 (elevated) 
Note: This comparison is only approximate and does not hold true in all cases. This is evidenced by DHC reports that 
parts of the wall system were often lost prior to failure of the entire roofing system. 
 
This suggests that the most populous failure class was loss of all roofing and approximately 
half the wall structure. In general, this agrees with the DHC survey. One difference between 
the two surveys is the amount of housing that experienced negligible damage. Figure 12(a) 
shows about 9 per cent of homes in this category, while Figure 11 shows only about 1 per 
cent of homes. It is perhaps not surprising that differences would appear at the lower end of 
the damage spectrum, given that a negligible level is somewhat subjective. Class 0 may have 
also been applied to the CSIRO survey if only minor wind pressure damage (i.e. not due to 
wind borne debris impact) was evident in, say, the loss of a single roof sheet, whereas this 
could have drawn a damage percentage of 0.1 (aggregated with 0.2 here) in the DHC survey. 
Irrespective of these differences, single-digit percentages of negligible damage imply a poor 
performance from the housing stock. 
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(a) Damage statistics for houses 
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(b) Damage statistics for industrial (engineered) buildings 
 
Figure 12: Damage statistics for (a) houses and (b) industrial (engineered) buildings 
collected by the CSIRO survey 
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The housing data from the CSIRO survey follow a similar trend to that presented for the DHC 
survey with a general increase in number of buildings per damage class up to a peak at class 
6. Housing is again broken into several main groups: low-set, elevated and multi-storey. The 
two main groups – low set and elevated – correspond to those used in the DHC survey, and 
the multi-storey category is expected to roughly correspond with elevated, built under; 
however, where the line between housing types was drawn is unclear. Viewing only elevated 
homes, it is again shown that this housing type drives the total housing distribution of damage 
to the higher end of the scale (6, 7). A distinct peak in damage class is evident for values of 6 
and 7, indicating that many homes lost their entire roof and more than half of their wall 
structure. The small values shown in classes 8 through 10 show that many of the sub-floor 
column systems remained upright despite the levels of destruction described above. This 
suggests that the sub-floor structure exhibited more strength than the wall/roofing system, 
though it is questionable whether as many would have survived if the above-floor structure 
had have maintained integrity to stronger wind speeds.   
Data for low-set homes again displayed a distribution favouring less severe damage, with the 
peak occurring prior to the loss of any wall structure – that is,  class 5. Multi-storey homes, 
as with the elevated built-under homes in the DHC survey, exhibited a relatively uniform 
distribution throughout the damage classes. 
For engineered steel-framed industrial buildings (Figure 12(b)), a clear shift towards lower 
damage classes is seen when compared with the distribution of houses. Approximately 28 per 
cent of industrial buildings suffered negligible damage, again clearly showing the superior 
performance of structures incorporating engineering principles in their design. More than 30 
per cent of structures suffered loss of significant levels of wall or roof sheeting, but relatively 
few, < 5 per cent, displayed a failure of primary structural members or total collapse. Baker 
and Walker (1976) suggest that despite the loss of sheeting on many structures, the cladding 
performance on industrial buildings outperformed cladding on residential housing. 
In summary, results from both damage surveys show the following key points: 
x Housing in general performed poorly, with approximately 60 per cent damaged to the 
extent that rebuilding was not feasible. 
x Elevated homes performed significantly worse than low set housing. 
x Buildings with engineering input into their design and construction performed 
considerably better than non-engineered housing despite wind speeds being greater 
than specified in the then current design standard. 
4.3 Spatial distribution of damage 
To determine the spatial distribution of damage throughout Darwin, the damage ratios for 
each residential structure, based on the DHC damage survey, are plotted in Figure 13. A 
distinct northern suburbs (and therefore north of the eye) bias is evident, with the northern 
most suburbs of Nakara, Tiwi and Wanguri being worst impacted. Arithmetic averaging of 
damage percentages over the suburbs to the north and south of the eye reveals average 
ratios of 0.62 and 0.42 to the north and south respectively. The increased basic wind speeds 
to the north, noted in Figure 3, in part defined this distribution, but this does not explain the 
near-complete destruction of the northernmost suburbs (Walker 1975).  
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Source: image courtesy of Geoscience Australia. 
Figure 13: Distribution of damage percentage ratios based on the DHC damage survey  
In Figure 14 we consider the average damage ratio at the suburb level. Comparison between 
the three northern most suburbs (Tiwi, Nakara and Wanguri) and the remaining northern 
suburbs, gives average (weighted by number of buildings) destruction ratios of 0.82 and 0.55 
respectively. This compares homes built prior to 1972 (refer Figure 9) and those built 
incorporating lessons learnt from Cyclone Althea (i.e. the three northernmost suburbs). The 
significantly higher destruction ratios for the newer homes suggest that, despite additional 
design information and a presumed higher level of wind resistance, these homes performed 
significantly worse than the older homes. In fact, the destruction ratio of 0.55 for the older 
northern suburbs homes suggests these buildings performed only marginally worse than 
those to the south of the eye (0.42), a difference that could arguably be put down to increased 
wind speed alone. 
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Figure 14: Distribution of damage percentage ratios by suburb 
 
In addition to wind speed and housing type, several other issues influence the true wind loads 
felt by a given structure. These are discussed in more detail below. 
The duration of high-velocity winds is important in determining the level and distribution of 
damage. Simply put, the longer a given structure is loaded by strong winds, the more likely it 
is to fail. Given Tracy’s slow translational speed, much of Darwin felt sustained high winds for 
a considerable period of time. This was particularly the case for the northern suburbs, where 
no lull was felt during the passage of the eye. Walker (1975) suggests, however, that the 
difference in loading duration for different parts of Darwin – or, more strictly speaking, the 
change in structural response to the differing wind loading durations – was not substantial 
enough to cause noticeable changes in the distribution of damage. 
Exposure can also play a vital role in determining the wind speed felt by a given building. 
Surface roughness significantly influences the structure of winds at or near the ground. In 
general, the rougher the surface – say, an area of high density housing compared with an 
open field – the more the surface will slow down winds near to it. This being the case, those 
buildings exposed directly to winds off the ocean will, all else being equal, experience higher 
wind loads than those several suburbs back from the beach. To investigate whether the poor 
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performance of the newer homes in the northernmost suburbs was due to their relatively 
exposed location, their averaged destruction ratio is compared with that for the similarly 
exposed conglomerate of Nightcliff, Rapid Creek, Millner and Coconut Grove. This 
comparison puts side by side two areas of roughly equivalent exposure – that is, both regions 
were hit by winds directly off the ocean, and allows an assessment of the housing types within 
each. An averaged destruction ratio of 0.55 is found for the four suburbs around Nightcliff, 
again significantly less than the 0.82 for the newer northern suburbs. This finding further 
solidifies the concept that it is design/construction features of the newer homes that drove the 
higher destruction ratios. 
Local topography also plays an important role in determining the wind load on individual 
buildings. When air moves over a surface that is not flat, wind speeds at a given height are 
either increased or decreased depending on the slope. In a broad sense, if the wind is blowing 
up an incline wind speed increases, while blowing down it decreases. In structural loading 
terms, a home sitting on the top of a hill will experience significantly higher wind loads than 
one in a valley. It is evident that a number of suburbs would be expected to have increased 
wind speeds due to their location. Nightcliff and Stuart Park to the north, and Larrakeyah and 
Darwin City to the south, for example, would have experienced intensified wind speeds due to 
the rapid increase in elevation with distance from the ocean. In contrast, suburbs such as The 
Narrows and Ludmilla, which suffered relatively low levels of damage (0.3 and 0.33), were for 
the most part in valleys to the lee of hills so would have been subject to reduced wind speeds. 
Walker (1975) suggests that the influence of topographic features may have contributed to the 
eyewitness reports of the second wind being stronger than the first in many of the southern 
suburbs.  
A further factor to influence localised wind loading is the upwind shielding. In the same way 
that standing behind someone or something on a windy day provides relief from oncoming 
winds, trees and surrounding buildings can shield a given structure from oncoming winds and 
thus reduce the wind loads. At the time of Tracy, the newer suburbs to the north were 
significantly less vegetated than the more established suburbs to the south. This meant that 
the level of shielding afforded the homes in the north was less than those to the south. The 
lack of vegetation may also have reduced the debris shielding to downwind buildings when 
material was lost from upwind homes (i.e. a tree can catch flying debris). However, trees can 
also be a significant source of flying debris themselves, and thus may cause just as much 
damage as they prevent. To further complicate this issue, the level of shielding provided by 
vegetation is dependent on the duration and intensity of strong winds. If, as was the case in 
Tracy, high wind speeds exist for extended durations, leaves and branches are stripped from 
trees and their shielding capacity substantially reduced. This was not widely considered 
before Tracy, and led to restrictions as to how subsequent building standards should be 
applied with respect to selection of terrain categories.  
4.4 Engineering explanations of structural failures 
The two most conspicuous failures mechanisms observed during Cyclone Tracy were the 
widespread loss of roof cladding and the lack of structural integrity, particularly of homes, 
once this and other cladding was lost (Walker 1975). Discussion of these factors (which were 
common to all structures) and a description of the most prevalent failure modes for each type 
of building are summarised below. The structure and content of this section follows that of 
Walker (1975) relatively faithfully. 
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4.4.1 Loss of roof cladding 
The loss of roof cladding was prevalent on both homes and engineered structures. Over 90 
per cent of houses and up to 70 per cent of all other structures lost components of their roof 
cladding system (Walker 1975). In many cases, the loss of roofing meant a loss of rigidity, 
weakening the building’s overall structural integrity. This loss occurred because cladding was 
often relied upon for bracing and load transfer. The two most significant factors contributing to 
the loss of roofing were: 
1. fatigue failure of cladding in the vicinity of fasteners due to dynamic wind loading, and 
2. a sudden increase in wind load on cladding due to a sudden increase in internal 
pressure following penetration of a windward wall by flying debris. 
After the substantial loss of roof sheeting during Cyclone Althea in Townsville, connections 
were structurally tested to ensure their capacity. The issue with this testing regime was that it 
was conducted in a static manner, assuming this was representative – or at least suitable – for 
describing the loading due to wind. However, wind by its very nature is turbulent, 
characterised by rapid fluctuations in velocity; thus, so too is the loads on a structure. In 
engineering terms, wind loading is dynamic. In tests conducted shortly after Tracy (Morgan & 
Beck 1977), it was found that for the level of fluctuations estimated to have occurred, dynamic 
loading could reduce the ultimate strength of the fastening system to 15 per cent of that found 
with the static testing rig. This meant that roof sheeting would fail at much lower load than it 
was rated for. As evidenced by the extent of damage, this was a load well exceeded during 
Tracy. This failure mode was particularly prominent in the post-Althea homes. 
The reason this failure mode had not been detected earlier was because in the early 1970s 
the housing industry shifted from using mild steel to thinner high-strength steel for roof 
sheeting. The static loading characteristics of these two materials are relatively similar, but 
dynamically they are very different. Under repeated loading conditions, mild steel – through its 
higher ductility – is able to deform repeatedly (in the vicinity of fastenings) without failing. 
High-strength steel, on the other hand, is much more brittle, and fails under substantially fewer 
load cycles (Figure 15(a)). Observations during the damage survey showed many instances of 
failure of the high-strength roof sheeting around fastenings, leaving these fastening attached 
to the roofing purlins (Figure 15(b)). 
It was not only the newer, high-strength steel roofing that suffered significant failures. 
Although older homes had fewer fatigue problems, the use of nails rather than screws as 
cladding fasteners meant sheeting was lost more often by simply pulling the nail and the 
sheeting from the purlin. This failure mechanism had been observed during Althea, and was 
the reason newer homes used screws. However, the traditional approach of fixing the purlin to 
the rafter by way of a wooden cleat in the construction of some older homes was replaced by 
a simpler direct nail joint. In these homes, failed roofs were found with sheeting, nails and 
purlin still attached but separated from the truss or rafter. This was the weakest connection in 
these roofing systems, and it failed before the sheeting could be pulled from the purlin. 
In analysing structural failures, it is useful to consider the old saying that a chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link. When a building is subject to extreme loading, the weakest 
component – typically a connection – will be exposed and will instigate failure.  
The force that must be restrained in order to keep the roof on is a combination of the external 
wind load trying to suck the roof off the home, and the internal pressure applied to the 
underside (inside) of the roof. Depending on the configuration of building openings – that is, 
doors, windows, and so on – the internal pressure could be positive (pushing the walls out and 
roof up) or negative (sucking the walls in and roof down). In the worst case, the internal 
pressure is positive acting to lift the roof off. To develop this loading scenario, an opening 
must exist on a windward wall, allowing air to be driven into the building and push outward on 
all surfaces. This process is shown schematically in Figure 16, and is conceptually analogous 
to blowing up a balloon. In cyclonic conditions, the most common cause of this loading 
scenario is when wind-borne debris penetrates the windward wall/window/door of a home. 
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(a) (b) 
Source: Morgan and Beck (1977). 
Figure 15: Failure of high-strength steel roof cladding over fastening screws in: 
(a) lab tests; and (b) as demonstrated by screws remain in a purlin after Tracy 
 
Source: Henderson et al. (2006). 
Figure 16: Wind forces with a dominant windward face opening 
The issue of internal pressures was not new to engineers or builders, but the general practice 
throughout Australia was to assume that all potential openings would maintain their integrity 
and the building would remain sealed. This practice led to the calculation of relatively small 
internal pressure loads and an under-estimation of hold-down requirements on the roofing 
when an envelope breach occurred. In Tracy, windward wall breaches were common, and the 
significantly higher than anticipated loads on the roof system were a significant factor in the 
loss of the roof from many homes. Several eyewitness reports describe the breaking of a 
window by flying debris followed almost immediately by the failure of part or all of the roof 
(McKay 2004).  
The roof cladding on larger buildings, despite having the same poor fastenings and absence 
of design for internal pressure, generally outperformed cladding on houses (Walker 1975). 
This occurred because of a reduction in the external suction pressures driven by differences in 
the building aerodynamics (i.e. differences in shape). Steeper roof pitches, removal of roof 
overhang, use of parapets and small height-to-span ratios all contributed to reductions in the 
roof loads and fewer failures. This behaviour was also noted for housing, where hip style 
roofing outperformed gable roofing due to inherent aerodynamic reductions in applied load 
and an increase in natural bracing. 
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4.4.2 Loss of wall cladding, windows and doors 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the most common type of wall cladding for residential homes was 
asbestos fibrous cement (fibro) sheeting or brick. On larger buildings, corrugated iron and 
ribbed metal decking were standard. 
Asbestos sheeting performed extremely poorly. Almost no home clad with this material 
escaped damage due to flying debris. This damage was so severe in many of the northern 
suburbs homes that, if still standing, houses showed a wall framing completely devoid of its 
cladding (Figure 17). Despite the capacity of asbestos cement as a shear resisting material 
(i.e. in the plane of the wall), it has an extremely low capacity to absorb impact, so as soon as 
any flying debris existed, these homes lost much of their rigidity.  
The tacked fastening of the asbestos cement to the frame was also found to be relatively 
poor. In many cases, the cyclic loading of a home worked (racked) the tacked nails out of the 
frame because of an inability to transfer load from the frame to the sheeting. This in effect 
nullified the shearing strength of this material and was the primary contributing factor in the 
racking failure of homes, discussed below in Section 4.4.3. 
  
(a) (b) 
Source: Walker (1975). 
Figure 17: Failure of asbestos sheeting through (a) debris impact and (b) racking 
When brick and concrete block masonry were used as non-structural veneers, they performed 
poorly under debris impact loads. Even when concrete masonry walls were infilled, their 
resistance to impact loading was poor unless reinforced. It is therefore clear that, irrespective 
of the cladding material, most houses were vulnerable to flying debris because of the veneer’s 
inability to absorb sudden impact loads.  
On larger buildings, and with a small number of homes, corrugated iron or ribbed metal was 
used for cladding and performed comparatively well. The reason for this was its ability to 
plastically deform when impacted by flying debris without tearing (Figure 18). This meant 
structures maintained their rigidity even when roofing was lost. 
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Source: Walker (1975). 
Figure 18: Survival of a house clad in sheet metal 
There were two predominant classes of window failure: the first was damage due to debris 
impact; the second involved the blowing out of complete window frames from walls. With the 
occurrence of so much wind-borne debris, the first of these is expected when non-impact-
resistant glass is used. Some reductions in window failures were observed when sunshade 
systems were in place and afforded an extra layer of protection from debris. The second of 
these issues is more serious from an engineering perspective because it implies that window 
framing was blown out under direct wind pressure – something against which it should have 
been designed. During the post-disaster survey, it was reported that many of the windows that 
failed in this manner showed little sign of connection between the window frame and the 
housing structure. Walker (1975) points out that this was clearly the result of a systematic 
failure in the construction and supervision practices for the installation of these features, but 
he also questions the window manufacturers’ role in not providing sufficient (if they even had 
it) information on fixing their products. The problem of both types of window failures was 
exacerbated with larger picture-type windows, as the surface area for impact and the direct 
wind pressure loading would have been greater. 
Failure of doors was reported primarily on blocks of flats or hotels. Failure occurred because 
approximately half the load had to be taken up by the latch, which did not have sufficient 
strength. This problem can be fixed by having additional bolts or latches to distribute the load 
transfer from door to frame.  
Large roller doors were a more severe problem, with almost 100 per cent of these failing. 
Failure of these doors had been observed during previous cyclones (James Cook University 
of North Queensland 1972), and is still an issue today (Henderson et al. 2006). The issue with 
roller doors was linked to their size and flexibility: when either strong winds or debris loaded a 
door, it would bow inward and pull the edges of the door from their guide rails. The larger the 
door, the greater the problem. Failure of a roller door itself was, however not the major issue: 
they typically failed on the windward face, thus allowing sudden internal pressurisation and 
enhanced loads on walls and roofing. In some instances, as with windows, failure to securely 
fasten door framing to the surrounding structure was observed. Despite the previous 
observation of roller doors as a problem, it is unclear that manufacturers or builders had 
addressed this issue. 
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4.4.3 Failure of housing 
As previously discussed, older homes outperformed newer ones. This was true for both 
elevated and low-set housing. 
For the Old Traditional elevated homes, the most common failure was the loss of roof cladding 
with or without the purlins, and serious debris damage to the asbestos cement wall cladding. 
In these homes, because diagonal timber bracing was used in walls and roofing, once roof 
sheeting was lost there was enough resilience in the structure to stop a total collapse of the 
frame. This was not the case for newer elevated homes, where roof bracing was removed, 
timber wall bracing was replaced by hoop iron straps, and cladding was supposed to provide a 
significant proportion of a home’s bracing capacity. In these homes, the general failure 
sequence was for debris to penetrate windward wall cladding, roof cladding to be lost, then a 
total failure of the framing system. Alternately, if enough of the wall cladding was lost, the 
hoop iron wall bracing would fail and the house would undergo racking failure (Figure 17).  
Older homes had considerably more bracing (roof and walls) and thus greater strength once 
cladding was lost. For the newer elevated homes, too much was required of the cladding 
system so that when it was removed, there was little remaining resistance in the structure and 
they fell down. Once the roof goes, there are many modes of failure for the rest of the 
structure. Walker (1975) therefore postulates that if the roof sheeting had remained on, homes 
would have maintained significant portions of their bracing ability, and the reduction in wind-
borne debris would have meant less damage to wall cladding, the by-product of which would 
have been a further increase in bracing strength.  
As with elevated homes, considerably more damage was done to newer low-set homes than 
older ones. This was perhaps even more prominent for low-set construction (Walker 1975), 
where a move from 11” cavity brick walls to either timber framed brick veneer or 300 mm 
masonry cavity (90 mm concrete block inner and brickwork outer leaf) significantly reduced 
the structure’s capacity to resist impact loading and to perform as a unified resisting element. 
Only about 10 per cent of older low-set homes suffered total failure, with many suffering only 
minor damage. For the newer homes, however, complete destruction was common.  
4.4.4 Failure of flats 
Damage most often observed to blocks of flats was to the roof and top storey (Figure 19). As 
with housing, loss of roof sheeting was due to inadequate fixing to the roofing purlins. Roof 
sheets were again expected to take up a significant proportion of the roof bracing, so once 
lost, failure of the roof system occurred. When failure of the end purlins occurred, end wall 
failure would generally follow because this purlin provided support for the top of the end wall. 
Insufficient tie-down of the roof structure to the remainder of the structural frame was also an 
issue noted as leading to failure of the roof, pulling down parts of the masonry walls. 
4.4.5 Failure of engineered buildings 
Structures that required an engineer to certify their structural capacity performed well (Section 
0). Of those that did fail, more often than not this was ascribed to inappropriate application of 
design standard concepts. This generally came about because of inadequate explanation in 
the standard. A by-product of this was generally the application of a design wind speed well 
below the probable wind speeds experienced during Tracy. A prominent example was the use 
of terrain category 3 (well built up or vegetated areas) in regions that were severely de-
vegetated by the extreme winds and more appropriately would have been classified as terrain 
category 2. A second example was the design of structures with large roller doors as 
nominally sealed buildings. Given the discussion in Section 0 on the poor performance of 
these doors, not clearly specifying that roller doors, unless designed to withstand wind and 
debris loading, as potential openings was inappropriate.  
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Source: Walker (1975). 
Figure 19: Failure of the top level of a block of flats 
 
Source: Baker & Walker (1976). 
Figure 20: Comparison of implied strength and loads on a simple rectangular 
‘engineered’ building 
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Figure 20 (Baker & Walker 1976) compares the implied loads on a simple rectangular 10 m 
high building due to the winds from Tracy and the range of design standards that would have 
been used throughout Darwin for engineered buildings that stood at the time. Ranges are 
given for implied terrain category 2 and 3, with and without design consideration for dominant 
openings. It is evident that for newer structures, if terrain category 2 and a dominant opening 
were considered (as was certainly the case for many buildings), the design of each building 
would most likely have been appropriate. However, if terrain category 3 and no dominant 
openings were used, the loads considered in design would have been significantly less than 
was experienced. 
There were some cases of failure of members, particularly in light-gauge cold-formed steel 
structures, where instability in members led to unexpected failures. Some of these failures 
were again linked to the assumption that cladding would act to transmit load from one element 
to another. Others were due to deficiencies in understanding of these failure mechanisms, and 
were therefore not represented appropriately in the design standards. 
4.4.6 The role of human error 
It is often suggested that many engineering failures come about through errors caused by 
sloppy construction and/or supervision. Walker (1975) suggests that the damage observed 
during Tracy was largely an engineering failure, and although some human errors were found, 
they were not the predominant reason for the majority of failures. Leicester and Reardon 
(2008), on the other hand, suggest that human error played a significant role in the observed 
failures. This, they suggest, can be put down not specifically to builders and certifiers alone, 
but to a housing design concept not amenable to error-free construction or inspection. They 
suggest that cottage-type housing construction, where builders connect together several 
hundred elements according to a set of specifications, is intrinsically too prone to error, and 
thus is unable to ensure a reliable transfer of load to the ground in the case of extreme 
loading. The authors also suggest that it is extremely difficult to inspect many of the 
connections, implying that many of these errors would slip through unchecked, thus 
weakening the housing strength. The implication is also made that the absence of suitably 
trained engineers from the design and construction process meant that there was little scope 
for improving many of the design practices, as in general home builders were unable to 
appreciate many of the load-transfer and resistance mechanics required to make these 
changes.  
With the extremely high wind speeds and extreme levels of destruction observed during 
Tracy, it is difficult to adjudicate upon the issue of human error. To justify their point, Leicester 
and Reardon (2008) use examples of pre- and post-Tracy building inspection surveys, as well 
as results from full-scale house testing at James Cook University, where construction errors 
were found in almost every home. Leicester suggests that even today errors are being built 
into houses, reducing their wind-resistant capacity. To overcome this, Leicester suggests a 
load bearing anchor type structure be incorporated into each home, upon which the remaining 
structure can be connected. What this concept essentially does is provide a relatively easily 
inspected structural load path that would ensure errors in the construction of the home’s base 
structural system could be easily identified. This concept is discussed further in Section 5.1.3. 
4.5 Building damage, loss of life and injury 
Although not the primary focus of this work, a rudimentary analysis of how building damage 
contributed to death and injury is justified. As outlined in the Introduction, the official number of 
deaths for Cyclone Tracy was 71, of which 50 occurred on land and 21 at sea (i.e. drowning). 
This total number was increased from 65 in 2005 when, after 30 years, a Northern Territory 
Coronial Inquiry officially attributed the drowning deaths of six people ‘lost at sea’ to the event 
(Morgan 2005). Of the 50 land-based deaths, the Darwin Reconstruction Study Group (1975) 
classifies 46 as shown in Table 3. Crush asphyxia is clearly the primary cause, with the 
majority of these deaths occurring due to falling masonry. Unreinforced internal and external 
blockwork walls, as well as unreinforced brickwork veneers, were the main contributors to this 
statistic. The remainder of deaths were associated with injuries sustained from flying debris 
impact, with roof sheeting and glass being most fatal. 
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Table 3: Cause of land-based fatalities  
Cause of fatality Number 
Crush asphyxia 31 
Crush asphyxia and glass laceration 2 
Crush asphyxia and iron (roof sheeting) laceration 5 
Iron (roof sheeting) lacerations 5 
Spearing or penetration by timber 3 
Total  (as reported on 10 January 1975) 46 
Source: after Darwin Reconstruction Study Group (1975) 
In addition to the 71 deaths, approximately 650 people suffered injuries severe enough to 
require medical treatment. Of these, approximately 500 were outpatients, the vast majority of 
whom suffered superficial lacerations from roof sheeting and glass. Approximately 140 
patients were admitted to hospital, with 64 suffering severe lacerations and 74 suffering blunt 
object impact injuries (some patients suffered both and some injuries were not recorded) 
(Darwin Reconstruction Study Group 1975). Dr AF Bromwich, a Senior Surgical Specialist, 
suggests: 
It is my impression that a higher proportion of these more severe lacerations 
[as compared with superficial lacerations] could have been caused by fibro-
asbestos as well as glass and corrugated iron. The blunt injuries were caused 
by flying objects such as timber, by falling object, again such as timber, or by 
crushing. In addition, a small number of fractures and contusions were caused 
by bodily impact – falls out of stilt houses, etc. 
It is clear that, in order to reduce the number of deaths and injuries, falling masonry and flying 
debris must be minimised as a priority.  
5. Post-event response, adaptation and lessons 
5.1 Building construction and standards 
It was abundantly clear in the aftermath of Tracy that the methods formerly used for design 
and construction of buildings –particularly housing – were inadequate and needed to be dealt 
with as a matter of urgency. The problem with this was that most engineers believed their 
construction methods were sound, particularly those incorporating changes made since Althea 
in 1971. In fact, only a few weeks before Tracy, the DHC lobbied the Commonwealth for funds 
to apply these changes to Darwin’s older homes in an attempt to enhance their wind 
resistance (Walker 2008). In the aftermath, therefore, there was no immediate understanding 
of why so many buildings had failed, and research had to be undertaken to discover this. This 
section details the response of the building and construction industries to this deficit, and 
discusses how knowledge gained from this process has helped adaptation for extreme wind 
events to this day.  
5.1.1 Immediate response 
Within five days of Tracy striking Darwin, the Commonwealth government had decided to 
establish a statutory body to plan, coordinate and undertake the leadership role in the 
reconstruction of Darwin, referred to as the Darwin Reconstruction Commission (DRC) 
(Walters 1978). The aim of the body was to ensure housing and living standards were 
returned to a suitable level as quickly and economically as possible. The DRC was therefore 
the government’s arm in Darwin, and had the skills of the DHC at its services. 
The DRC’s first role was to direct Housing Commission and DHC staff to survey house and 
flat accommodation to determine which of these could be repaired temporarily to provide 
shelter for those staying in Darwin. This information formed the basis of the damage statistics 
discussed in Section 4.1. Those buildings could be repaired were done so temporarily (650 
structures were demolished or made safe and 4600 structures were re-roofed), but the 
decision was made that no reconstruction would occur until the cause of failures was identified 
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and design practices changed to account for them. This view was vocalised by the federal 
government and personally espoused by the prime minister. Significant will for this goal also 
existed, at least initially, amongst the general population of Darwin and the country because of 
widespread horror at the level of destruction that had taken place. This will to learn from a 
disaster (and act upon it) seems to have been an important factor that monetarily equivalent, 
but outwardly less catastrophic, disasters since have lacked (e.g. the Newcastle earthquake). 
This has inhibited the ability of these events to impact accepted methods of design and 
construction in the same way that Tracy has done (G Reardon, pers. comm., 5 November 
2009; G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009).  
Ownership was also a big issue. The Commonwealth owned 40 per cent of the housing in 
Darwin, and a significant proportion of those they didn’t own had originally been built by the 
DHC before being sold on to private owners. The blame for any failures therefore rested  
squarely with the government, and it was its responsibility to ensure this didn’t happen again, 
a responsibility that was taken seriously. The DHC’s role as the body in charge of building 
meant it was responsible for delivering ‘a cyclone resistant Darwin’, as promised to the 
population by the government in the days following Tracy (Walker 2008). On top of this, the 
level of destruction clearly indicated that there was an issue with current practice, with no 
clearly defined solutions. Whether a moratorium such as that enforced after Tracy could be 
applied today is debatable. This is a point taken up in later discussion. 
With a moratorium on reconstruction, the DHC, academic institutions, engineers and 
architects compiled damage documentation and determined the reasons for observed failures. 
Within less than a month, this information had been used to draft a new Darwin Area Building 
Code (Department of Housing and Construction 1975). The final report describing the impact 
of Cyclone Tracy on buildings was released within three months (Walker 1975), and the 
official Darwin Area Building Manual was released early in 1975. The major recommendations 
and implications of these changes are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Housing to be engineered 
A new approach to housing design had to be adopted in tropical cyclone regions. The level of 
destruction, and the peril to human safety Tracy had posed, clearly showed the traditional 
housing approach to be inadequate for high-impact, low-occurrence events. The 
recommendation made was that houses be considered to be on the same level as public, 
commercial and industrial buildings, with the requirement that structural strength be certified 
by an engineer prior to commencement of construction, and with adequate supervision 
provided throughout the construction period. This was a radical recommendation that had not 
previously been implemented anywhere in the world for wind-resistant design. New Zealand 
was the only country to enforce engineering design of housing, and this was for earthquake, 
not wind (G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009). Historical opposition to this approach lay 
in the fact that the engineering costs were considered too high with respect to the cost of a 
single home. However, with newer homes increasingly being built from standardised plans, 
engineering becomes viable if the cost is spread over all housing built from a given plan. 
Shift to limit state design philosophy for cyclone regions 
Any enforced design philosophy for housing construction would be considered an 
improvement on what was in practice prior to Tracy, but even the design of engineered 
structures could be improved by the implementation of limit state design. This 
recommendation was not new. Standards Australia was already in the process of discussing a 
change to the limit state philosophy; Tracy, however, provided the impetus to hasten this 
change (J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 2009; G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 
2009). 
Limit state design represented a shift in thinking more amenable to regions with long-tailed 
peak-wind gust distributions. The use of working stress design philosophy (and therefore its 
factors of safety) was largely developed in regions with less skewed velocity distributions (i.e. 
closer to a normal distribution), where the likelihood of extreme excursion was low. In practice, 
this meant the chance of the design velocity being exceeded by a significant amount was very 
small, even if distribution shape varied slightly between locations (see Figure 21). This 
scenario is suitably accounted for using a single factor of safety. In cyclone-prone regions, 
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however, the wind speed distribution extends well past what would be set for the design wind 
speed (e.g. the 50-year return period gust) (see Figure 21). Therefore, simply applying a 
factors-of-safety derived based on a normal type distribution could not ensure that significant 
structural failures (i.e. design strength exceeded) would not occur during extreme events. This 
fact was realised by engineers, and an additional factor of safety – the cyclone factor – was 
applied in practice. 
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Source: after Walker (1975).
Figure 21: Interaction between wind speed and strength for normal and long-tailed 
distributions 
The shift to a limit state design philosophy effectively meant the tail of the wind speed 
distribution had to be considered on a case-by-case basis with a second, ultimate limit wind 
speed identified.  This ultimate limit was the wind speed up to which a building was required to 
remain safe, but to which localised failures (e.g. large deflections or cracking) were accepted. 
In effect, two wind speeds were now set for design of each structure, one at a return period 
level to ensure there would be no outward signs of structural distress over the lifetime of a 
structure, and a second, higher wind speed to ensure that in the event of a cyclone with, say, 
the 500-year return period wind gust, a structure would maintain its integrity so the occupants 
would remain safe. The limit state design approach was not implemented immediately, but 
after several years of research and development it was introduced into engineering practice in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s (G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009), and officially into 
the wind standard in 1989. 
The two recommendations discussed above required conceptual and philosophical changes 
to be made to the way buildings were designed and constructed. This process required 
considerable research and improvements in understanding, and as such could not be 
implemented immediately. Therefore, because the adoption of a suitable building code was 
deemed essential before reconstruction could proceed (Department of Housing and 
Construction 1975), it was recommended that new cyclone provisions be developed and 
incorporated into the Australian Model Uniform Building Code (AMUBC), with the ensuing 
document, the Darwin Area Building Manual, legally replacing the Northern Territory Building 
Manual. At this stage, there was still some subjectivity to the new cyclone wind provisions; 
however, it was felt they were conservative in nature, and could be adjusted as the required 
research was performed (Walker 1975). A continual review process of the code was 
recommended. In essence, this led to an overly conservative initial set of design specifications 
that in time would be wound back to a level that more appropriately represented an 
acceptable level of safety as well as cost-effective design.  
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The specific recommendations made to be implemented in the reconstruction of Darwin – 
some with reference to the entire cyclone-prone region of Australia – were: 
x The definition of cyclone areas. Specific zones should be set so it was clear where 
cyclone provisions should be applied.  
x Update and amend the AMUBC. It was important to update the AMUBC so that 
Darwin-specific regulations could be included. It was also required that the 
deficiencies in the standards called upon in this document were highlighted so new 
recommendations could be used. The recommendation also called upon Standards 
Australia to be notified of all deficiencies in their documents. The Standards most 
notably requiring changes were: 
– AS1170: Minimum Design Loads on Structures 
– CA 38-1971: Light timber framing Code 
– AS1562: Design and Installation of Self-supporting Metal Roofing, and 
– CA 32-1967: Concrete Block Masonry Code. 
The AMUBC, as with all other design codes of the time, was lacking in design 
specifications for housing. This information was developed as a set of deemed-to-
comply standards for the AMUBC as a matter of urgency prior to reconstruction 
beginning in Darwin (Department of Housing and Construction 1975). This is the first 
such case anywhere in the world, so was not a trivial exercise. 
x All reconstructed housing to be designed by an engineer. This was the initial 
application of the first conceptual recommendation above. Although there were only 
limited guidelines for housing construction in standards, the use of an engineer at the 
design phase would have ensured general engineering principals were satisfied in the 
design of new homes. It was expected that by using the design specifications 
currently set out for engineered structures, homes would have considerably more 
resilience that those built by the traditional method. 
x Increase in design wind speed: The general good performance of engineered 
structures during Tracy suggests that the design wind speed was set at a reasonable 
level (when using factors of safety). However, given the short period of wind records, 
and the exceedance of the specified design wind speed, it was lifted from 49 m/s to 
55 m/s. As discussed in Section 3.3, a cyclone factor of 1.15 was also applied to 
elevating the effective design wind speed further. 
x In the current design standard, AS1170 part 2, 2002, the design wind speed for 
Darwin at a return period of 50 years is 52 m/s with a cyclone multiplier of 1.05, in 
effect roughly aligning with the pre-Tracy specification. This comparison, however, is 
only valid for engineered structures. The implementation of engineered design to 
housing and the assignment of enforceable design wind speeds to these structures 
represented a significant increase in required resilience and a step change their 
safety (G Reardon, pers. comm., 5 November 2009). 
x Specification of a minimum category reduction factors. Minimum wind speed 
reduction factors to account for defoliation occurring during extreme wind events and 
acceleration over topography were set. The minimum allowable design wind speeds 
for structures embedded in suburban regions became 45 m/s, and for those on the 
top of cliffs, 65 m/s.  
x All housing to be designed for full internal pressurisation. All housing required 
design for the additional loads that would occur through failure of a windward window 
or loss of cladding due to debris impact or high localised pressures. This scenario was 
generally neglected prior to Tracy, under the assumption that windows would not 
break under wind pressure, overlooking the threat of debris impact. The 
recommendation was not required for commercial or industrial buildings if measures 
were taken to stop debris impact failures. To justify debris impact ability, it was 
required that the ability to withstand a 4 kg piece of 100 mm x 50 mm travelling at 20 
m/s could be demonstrated. Specification of this test in the Darwin Area Building 
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Manual was the first implementation of a standardised test for debris impact anywhere 
in the world (Minor 2005). 
x Improvements to cladding design. Cladding was no longer allowed to be used for 
bracing the supporting frame of large structures, but could still be used to this end in 
housing design, provided provision was made for debris impact resistance, and the 
building was designed to a higher specification (i.e. to withstand a higher wind speed) 
than normal. Irrespective of the type of building, all roof cladding fixing systems were 
required to resist the newly developed fatigue tests to account for the cyclic nature of 
wind loading and reduce the number of failures observed with the high-strength steel 
sheeting (Section 4.4.1. These recommendations have the specific objective of 
keeping the roof on at all costs (Walker 1975). This was considered essential because 
of the enormous effect that loss of roofing had on the damage, through both 
production of flying debris and the loss of structural rigidity due to loss of the major 
bracing element. Keeping the roof on also maximises the safety of the internal 
occupants and minimises loss of contents.  
x Strengthened design of masonry walls. Unreinforced masonry performed 
extremely poorly, causing structural failures and danger to life due to falling masonry. 
To minimise these effects, all masonry was to be designed using relevant design 
standards, which in essence meant much of it required reinforcement and bond 
beams (fixed to the roofing). Enhanced strength was required for internal masonry to 
minimise the danger this material posed when falling. Restricting masonry veneer to 
the ground level was also recommended to further reduce the risk of falling brickwork. 
On top of the structural benefits of strengthening masonry walls, stopping masonry 
from falling was of vital importance, given that the major cause of death during Tracy 
was asphyxiation caused by the collapse of these walls on to people (Section 4.5). 
x Design of windows and doors, and their connection to the wall frame. Failure of 
windows and doors often initiated failure of a building. It was generally the case that, 
despite standards being available, the fixing of windows and doors to the remainder of 
the building structure was left to the builder. Recommendations were that designers 
utilise the available standards to specify connections to ensure resistance to wind 
pressures. Although this recommendation does not account for debris impact, 
ensuring the wind pressure load could be transferred to the main structural frame 
without failure was a significant improvement over what had existed previously. The 
issue with designing windows for debris impact is that it is not practical to use glass of 
suitable width to ensure its integrity under impact loading. From an overall structural 
safety point of view, debris failure of a windward window should not be an issue if the 
design recommendation for full internal pressurisation is applied. Failure of windows 
does, however, increase the potential for injury of occupants (e.g. lacerations due to 
glass, increased risk debris flying into the building), and increases the damage to 
contents. This second point may be significant for commercial and retail outlets. 
Shutters, sun-shading devices or similar window protection are suggested as a 
possible amelioration technique, but this was not enforced in the recommendations 
given the previous internal pressure recommendations. Where window protection is 
used, Walker (1975; pers. comm., 28 October 2009) cautions that this should not be 
done at the expense of design for full internal pressurisation, but recommends their 
use as an additional safety measure. He also cautions that unless window protection 
is implemented as a semi-permanent feature, the relatively low frequency of required 
use may present maintenance problems.  
x In residence shelters. In tornado-prone regions of the United States, the presence of 
an internal safe room, where a resident can reside during a severe storm, is common. 
These safe rooms are designated areas within a building designed to withstand more 
severe wind and debris loading than the remainder of the structure, and provide a 
place for occupants to go during cyclones. It was recommended that research be 
performed to test the viability of this type of construction in cyclone regions, with the 
possible incorporation of this design into the laundry or bathroom of housing. Initial 
recommendations suggested a design wind speed of 80 m/s for these rooms. This 
recommendation would remove any danger from flying debris that enters a building, 
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and also ensure occupant safety if, despite application of improved design methods, 
other parts of the building fail. Construction of a room such as this will, however, come 
at an increased cost to the home, and for regions prone to storm surge would not be 
suitable. 
x Strengthening of existing homes: It was recommended that non-destroyed homes 
be modified, where possible, to incorporate the concepts embodied in the 
recommendations for new buildings. Generally, it would not be possible for the 
structural system to be modified, so methods such as overbattens were 
recommended. This recommendation does not afford the same level of protection as 
a new home, but does work to ensure the roof remains on the structure. Walker 
(1975) highlights that many other cities in cyclonic regions have significant levels of 
buildings constructed similarly to those in Darwin, and therefore would suffer 
comparable destruction if a storm equivalent to Tracy were to occur, unless some 
level of retrofit is conducted. J Holmes (pers. comm., 3 December 2009) suggests that 
this is even the case today, with Cairns being particularly vulnerable. 
x Education: Those involved in the building of new homes in cyclone-prone regions 
must receive training on how and why changes to traditional methods are required. 
This service should be free.  
x Inspections: Given that regulations cannot be ensured in the absence of inspections 
at critical stages of the construction process, it was recommended that stricter 
enforcement of building inspections at critical stages be applied. This necessitated a 
better definition of where the critical stages were, and required that a sufficient 
number of appropriately qualified inspectors were available. It was also recommended 
that a certificate be obtained prior to occupancy from an appropriate building 
authority.  
These recommendations addressed all failings observed during the damage survey. To arrive 
at several of the recommendations, significant structural testing was required. This was 
achieved through use of local engineering consultants, DHC and other government personnel, 
in consultation with nationally respected academics in the field. The DHC completed the work 
of which it was capable, and outsourced that it couldn’t do, or which could be done 
quicker/better by external consultants. The first new housing was started on 25 June 1975, 
and the first homes were completed in December of that year. This meant that it took less 
than six months for an existing building practice to be broken down and redeveloped in a 
manner more amenable to cyclone wind resistance. Within this period, builders and certifiers 
were trained in new methods of construction and educated on the new regulations to be 
implemented. From an engineering perspective, the quantity of work achieved in only a few 
months, and the ready acceptance of ideas and methods by a naturally conservative and 
often entrenched industry was remarkable. 
The overall cost of implementing the cyclone-resistant recommendations to residential 
housing was approximately $5000 per home (Cole 1977). With a rebuilding cost of 
approximately $35 000 to $45 000 (Appendix 2), this value represents an increase in costs of 
the order of 10 per cent. For more recent construction, a value of 5 per cent is expected to be 
more appropriate when included at the time of construction, but increases to 15–50 per cent 
for retrofitting (G Reardon, pers. comm., 5 November 2009; Stewart 2003). 
5.1.2 Adaptation and lessons 
All major recommendations were implemented in the reconstruction of Darwin (Walker 2008). 
Walker suggests that this occurred in large part because of the control the federal government 
had in Darwin, and the significant role the DHC had in implementing its plans. To be sure, the 
DHC at the time of Tracy found itself in a unique position where the most suitable body to 
make the change (i.e. the DHC), was actually in a relatively unimpeded position to implement 
the changes deemed necessary.  
Today, however, the DHC does not exist and the federal government no longer controls 
Darwin. So the question of whether the same type of response could be achieved if a Tracy-
like event were to recur today must be asked. Throughout this section, the way Australia’s 
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wind-resistant design regulations, and the bodies responsible for governing design and 
construction, have adapted in light of Tracy are discussed, and an attempt made to answer 
the question posed in the previous sentence. 
Over the years following the introduction of the Darwin Area Building Manual, the 
recommendations for the reconstruction of Darwin were gradually made more codified and 
introduced into national design standards. To a large extent, many of the recommendations 
have remained relatively unchanged, in principle if not in value, to the present day (Walker 
2008). 
In 1975, Standards Australia released a major revision to AS1170 Part 2, which began to 
address the shortcomings of relying solely on a Gumbel analysis of historic gust records to 
specify design wind speeds. Newly developed methods of probabilistic cyclone modelling 
began to be employed. Cyclone Tracy highlighted the inability of a local, short-record Gumbel 
analysis to, in all cases, predict wind speeds for extremely rare events. Probabilistic models, 
on the other hand, were able to (to a degree) account for these through a series of statistical 
averaging processes in their calculations. In combination, the two methods showed was that 
design wind speeds in many tropical cyclone regions were too low and should be increased. 
The 50-year return period design wind speed of 55 m/s recommended for the Darwin Area 
Building Manual (Section 0) was shown to be suitable for Darwin and was specified as such in 
AS1170.  
The 1975 revision also saw the formalisation of the idea introduced in the 1971 version that 
the entire northern coast was susceptible to cyclonic winds, despite the absence of monitoring 
stations in some locations or the absence from records of cyclonic winds in others. To this 
end, a three-tier cyclone zoning system was introduced. The first zone was the strip within 50 
km of the coast above 27°S (the same area to which the 1.15 cyclone factor was applied the 
1971 standard) which, as for Darwin that sits within it, was assigned a design wind speed of 
55 m/s. The remaining two zones were successive inland 10 km strips, with decreasing design 
wind speeds of 50 m/s and 45 m/s respectively (see Appendix 1). These latter two zones 
accommodated the decreasing wind speed displayed by a decaying cyclone as it moved 
inland.  
Although there have been some changes to exact boundaries and designated wind speeds, 
the concept of coastal cyclone zones is still used today (Appendix 1). To determine the 
appropriate wind speeds for each zone, a mixture of the probabilistic and historic wind record 
analysis methods is used (J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 2009). In general, the higher 
wind speed for a particular area based on both methods is used in the standard. Cook and 
Nicholls (2009) have suggested a return to a more detailed wind speed contour-type map – for 
example, as shown in Figure A1.1, such as used in the United States. In reality, however, this 
attributes too much confidence in the ability of models to predict locally accurate wind speeds 
without recourse to significant validation.  
More accurate contour-style zoning is possible in the United States because the number of 
surface wind speed monitoring stations is significantly higher than in Australia, and the need 
for more accurate location-specific estimates is greater given the population density on the 
cyclone-prone coastline. In the Australian context, the monitoring network for cyclonic winds 
around the coast is so sparse, and the vast majority of the coast unpopulated, that the need 
for a more precise velocity contour system seems unnecessary and the ability to validate one 
is unrealistic. Irrespective, the framework exists in the current cyclone zoning system to 
account for regions of intense cyclonic activity. Examples of this were the treatment of Onslo 
in the 1975 revision and the specification of Region D in the 2002 edition (to be discussed 
later in this section).  
Cook and Nicholls (2009) also raise the issue of modern adaptations to the probabilistic 
approach of wind risk modelling, and improvements these can make to wind hazard 
prediction. In their paper, Cook and Nicholls use a numerical weather prediction-type model 
that couples the ocean–atmosphere interaction, as well as accounting for historic records of 
sea surface temperature and wind shear (Emanuel et al. 2006; Vickery et al. 2009). 
Compared with probabilistic models, such as those contributing to the current cyclonic design 
wind speeds, this analysis method utilises more contributing environmental factors into the 
calculations of cyclone behaviour, and reduces the need to rely solely on statistical models. 
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However, at this stage it is difficult to determine the validity of this modelling approach and the 
relatively untested nature of the science behind the predictions (Vickery et al. 2009). Given 
this, the authors’ finding that the cyclone risk for Darwin was significantly higher than that 
accounted for in the current design standard was greeted with scepticism by the wind 
engineering community (J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 2009; L Pham, pers. comm., 3 
December 2009; G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009). Numerical weather prediction-
type models will, however, most likely be used in the next generation of cyclone risk models 
(Vickery et al. 2009); however, it is felt that there is not significant evidence to justify applying 
their current findings to design standards, at least in the short term. 
The adoption of the Darwin Area Building Manual for the reconstruction of Darwin led to the 
recognition that similar measures should be applied in other cyclonic regions of Australia of 
similar risk (Walker & Reardon 1987). This seemed particularly pertinent for the more highly 
populated eastern coast of Queensland. However, despite the recommendations made for the 
reconstruction of Darwin, the lack of legal obligation meant that relatively few areas applied 
the new testing measures, and most continued to build in the same manner as they had 
always done. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the Department of Construction (formally the 
DHC) agreed to host a workshop in 1977 to review and update the criteria adopted in Darwin 
and determine their applicability to other cyclone-prone regions of the country. The workshop 
was attended by representatives of a wide cross-section of the building industry, with 
academics, researchers, industry, Standards and government representatives, as well as 
consulting engineers, in attendance. The outcome of this workshop was a set of guidelines for 
the testing and evaluation of products intended for use in cyclone-prone regions of the 
country. The document was known as TR440 and rapidly became the ‘bible’ for construction 
in many areas (Walker 2004).  
By and large, the conceptual principles of the Darwin Area Building Manual were accepted 
and embodied in TR440, with particular endorsement of the recommendations for: 
x full engineering of housing, though acknowledging that this would be a gradual 
process (Department of Construction 1977) 
x design for full internal pressurisation unless protective measures were taken 
x the specification of a debris impact test, and 
x the necessity for fatigue testing of roof cladding. 
Some of the Darwin recommendations were, however, scaled back in TR440, with the 
magnitude of internal pressure required for design reduced in some cases, the impact velocity 
for debris impact tests dropping from 20 m/s to 15 m/s and the fatigue testing loads reduced. 
These reductions were a reflection of research findings conducted since and in light of Tracy. 
An additional recommendation by TR440 was that separate, less stringent (25-year return 
period) loading criteria be specified for serviceability (e.g. deflections and cracking of 
members) requirements. This is seemingly the first shift towards limit state type 
recommendations, reflecting the shift in the structural engineering community towards this 
design philosophy. 
TR440, in its commentary section, highlights an important point, one that was a significant 
impediment to implementing structural engineering concepts in housing design. It states: 
In a large section of the housing industry, the control and supervision of 
housing design and construction is not in the hands of people with engineering 
training and consequently sophisticated codes of practice prepared by 
engineers for engineers are often not appropriate. The wind-loading code is a 
good example of this. Its use requires a considerable degree of engineering 
judgment particularly in relation to the choice of terrain category and internal 
pressure coefficients. In addition the degree of sophistication of the wind code 
is far greater than that exercised in the design and construction of housing. 
For the reconstruction of Darwin, because it was specified that a structural engineer must be 
involved with the design of housing, the implications of the above statement were somewhat 
muted. For other regions of the country, though, engineers were not required, and judgement 
decisions were left to the builders. To minimise this problem, TR440 specified a simplified set 
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of design and testing criteria for use by the housing industry. The TR440 commentary 
continues by suggesting that: 
It is inevitable that this approach will lead to some individual houses being 
overdesigned and perhaps others being underdesigned. The primary object, 
however, is to limit the impact of tropical cyclones on the community as a 
whole by reducing the total potential for damage, rather than guaranteeing the 
absolute security of every individual dwelling. This is not considered a serious 
objection, particularly as the variables and uncertainties inherent in the current 
design and construction of dwellings are probably of greater magnitude.  
Although TR440 was widely accepted, its non-legal standing meant the penetration of its 
concepts and test methods was incomplete, and in practice varied from state to state. 
Queensland was the most receptive, with the 1981 inclusion of the Home Building Code of 
Queensland as an appendix in the state building regulations. The Home Building Code 
embodied many of the findings of TR440 and, due to its widespread use, ensured many of the 
principles were applied by designers. Use of TR440 was not as widespread in Western 
Australia, but the general awareness of tropical cyclones and their potential effects on 
buildings, and the relatively high frequency of occurrence, meant that traditional housing 
design methods were already quite well adapted to cyclonic loading conditions. In the 
Northern Territory, however, TR440 was not accepted, and the Darwin Area Building Manual 
continued to be used. Although these two documents were similar, the Northern Territory 
authorities were reluctant to reduce some of the loading criteria to TR440 levels, choosing in 
most cases to keep using the (generally) more conservative of the documents. The non-
uniform take up of this document highlighted the need for a legal framework that would ensure 
cyclone resistance throughout cyclone-prone regions. 
The next major step in improved resilience through codification came with the publication of 
the 1989 version of AS1170 Part 2. It was with this update that the recommendation of a shift 
to limit state design was realised. This was not just done for the wind standard, but was 
implemented throughout the suite of loading standards (i.e. wind, earthquake, snow). In 
reality, many practising engineers had moved to the limit state design philosophy prior to this 
time, largely driven by the DHC’s decision to do so throughout the country shortly after Tracy. 
Given the DHC was such a big player in the construction industry, its transition ensured that 
many in the structural engineering profession would follow (Walker 2004). Irrespective, this 
was the first nationwide instance of a standardised limit state wind resistant design manual in 
this country. There were many other significant changes that occurred with this update. Some 
of the more significant, which can directly be linked to either Cyclone Tracy or the research 
performed because of Cyclone Tracy, were: 
x the inclusion of many of the guidelines embodied in TR440, including specification of 
the cladding fatigue test not accepted by the Northern Territory 
x specification of wind speeds for ultimate limit (1000-year return period), serviceability 
limit (25-year), and permissible stress (ultimate load/1.5, notionally equivalent to the 
50-year return period) design 
x removal of all contours from the design wind speed map, leaving zones exclusively to 
determine design wind speeds. Four wind zones were used, A, B, C and D, signifying 
regions where peak wind gusts are generated by thunderstorm or synoptic-scale 
storms, decaying tropical cyclones or thunderstorm wind gusts, tropical cyclones up to 
a mid-range category 4, or severe tropical cyclones respectively. Exact boundary 
locations changed somewhat from the 1975 edition, but the general concept 
embodied in the earlier standard continues here. 
x development and inclusion of a simplified deemed-to-comply design procedure for 
housing construction, and 
x development of a more rational approach to wind speed multiplier selection. 
Therefore, the 1989 edition of AS1170 Part 2 completed the standardisation of all major 
recommendations set out in the post-Tracy report. That is, the two philosophical 
recommendations – engineering design of all housing and the move to a limit state design 
philosophy – were achieved, and most of the technical issues relating to, for example, internal 
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pressures and fatigue loading were covered in specific clauses – at least for cyclone-prone 
regions.  
One discrepancy that did remain was the Northern Territory’s refusal to accept the fatiguing 
test outlined in AS1170 Part 2, and its continued requirement that the test specified in the 
Darwin Area Building Manual be performed. Given that the state/territory has the final say on 
regulations, this type of local anomaly was possible. Granted, the recommended test 
prescribed in TR440 and subsequently the 1989 version of the wind standard was derived 
based on a limited number of experiments (Walker & Reardon 1987). The Northern Territory 
building community was therefore justified in its insistence on application of a conservative 
test. In subsequent years, additional tests were performed and indeed showed, in some 
instances, that the specified TR440 test was not conservative, and thus required modification. 
The modified test is now incorporated into the wind standard, but this came about only after a 
period of many years and significant political roadblocks (Walker 2009).  
During the move from working stress to limit state design, the necessity for the cyclone factor, 
1.15, to be applied to the design wind speed was no longer considered necessary and was 
removed. What also occurred in the transition was that the 1.5 factor of safety applied to the 
wind loading, which in theory accounted for the higher wind speeds of extreme events – that 
is, the shift from the specified 50-year return period to the 1000-year return period – was no 
longer used. In essence, this meant that previous standards had assumed the ratio of ultimate 
to working stress design condition wind speeds was ¥1.5 instead of allowing the wind speed 
distribution to determine this value. The theoretical advantage of the limit state approach is 
that the actual limit state can be predicted. Of course, this assumes that there is enough data 
to make accurate predictions out to this return period. What this meant for Darwin was that the 
effective design wind speed in the 1989 standard dropped back to just above the pre-Tracy 
level. This was a winding in of what was perceived to be an over-reaction in the aftermath of 
Tracy, and was probably warranted given the engineered buildings utilising the pre-Tracy 
design wind speeds performed relatively well. 
Outside the fatigue testing case, the 1989 standard represented the last time direct lessons 
from Cyclone Tracy have been used to directly change a building standard, though these 
lessons still run through these documents. This statement is true for cyclonic and non-cyclonic 
regions alike, because much of the research performed in light of Tracy provided information 
on wind resistance as a general principal, which is equally valid in all regions (Walker 2004).   
At present, the 1989 standard has been superseded by a 2002 edition of AS1170 Part 2, 
which again has evolved based on research since the release of the previous edition. This 
edition was to be superseded during 2010, with further changes made. Although many 
changes exist in these documents, two are of significant importance to the current discussion. 
The first is that the wind loading standard no longer specifies a simplified design procedure for 
small structures. This process has been moved to a separate standard, AS4055 Wind Loading 
for Housing (first introduced in 1992 then superseded in 2006). This document is in principal 
based upon AS1170 Part 2 and is a simplified version of the information presented within that 
document for use by the housing industry. In practice, however, differences have emerged 
between the two documents, with simplifications and the acceptance of a higher level of risk 
often leading to lower design wind loads in the housing standard (J Holmes, pers. comm., 
3 December 2009; L Pham, pers. comm., 3 December 2009). 
Leitch et al. (2009) highlight specific differences between the two, specifically in the 
determination of topographic and shielding multipliers. Lack of communication between 
committees for the two standards is contributing to these differences and must be addressed 
by Standards Australia if uniformity is to be ensured (J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 
2009). This problem is not helped by ever-diminishing funding for the development of new 
standards by Standards Australia and the diminishing willingness of companies/institutions for 
their staff to be involved at company expense. The perceived status that once existed for a 
member of these committees, and which contributed to the willingness of employers to 
release and fund employee involvement, is now also much diminished (L Pham, pers. comm., 
3 December 2009; G Reardon, pers. comm., 5 November 2009). If these issues are not 
addressed, it is likely that, despite the best intentions of committees, the quality of standards 
will suffer. 
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The second change made in the 2002 edition, which was to be carried forward to the 2010 
edition, is that AS1170 Part 2 no longer offers guidance on the appropriate design wind speed 
structures – that is, the standard no longer specifies that, say, ultimate design should be 
based on the 1000-year gust. It was viewed that the wind loading standard, a technical 
document, had no place in determining the acceptable public risk. This was considered a 
public policy issue, and thus a responsibility to be transferred to the state regulating 
authorities (Pham 2007). Instead, design wind speeds are now given for a range of return 
periods, and a designer must reference the Building Code of Australia (which is ratified by 
state governments, refer to the next sectionbelow) to determine the appropriate minimum 
value. The reasons for this change are discussed further in the following section, but in 
general what it has meant for the design of general structures is that the acceptable return 
period for ultimate limit design has changed from 1000 years to 500 years. This in effect 
reduced the design wind speed in the 2002 revision from its 1989 level. However, the 
reintroduction of cyclone factors – 1.05 for region C and 1.1 for region D – has meant that in 
practice there has been little change in the actual wind speed used for design. 
Building Code of Australia 
In all, the progression made by standards means little if these documents are not used by the 
building industry. It is the responsibility of state or territory governments to set building 
regulations (Section 3.3), and these bodies in general will ensure the use of standards by 
calling upon them in a deemed-to-satisfy manner in these (legal) regulations. The first attempt 
to nationally unify the way in which states and territories regulated their building practice was 
through the Australian Uniform Building Code, as introduced in Section 3.3. As discussed, this 
document set out technical and administrative guidelines upon which states and territories 
could develop their own regulations. 
During the late 1970s, the AMUBC was implemented by state and territory governments, 
though many chose to vary quite considerably from the original format. Variation was 
particularly common on the way states chose to administer the regulations, but agreement on 
technical specifications was generally good (Australian Building Codes Board 2009). By the 
end of the 1970s, it was clear that national adoption of the AMUBC in its current format would 
not occur, primarily because a consensus on administrative regulations proved elusive. Thus, 
in 1980, the federal, state and territory governments created the Australian Uniform Building 
Regulations Co-ordinating Council (AUBRCC) to develop a national building code, focusing 
solely on the technical components in the AMUBC. This document was the Building Code of 
Australia (BCA), which was completed in 1990 and was the first technical building code usable 
across the nation. As with the AMUBC, states and territories were still given the opportunity to 
add local variations, such as, stricter cyclone provisions in the Northern Territory, but the aim 
was to keep these deviations to a minimum. It took several further years, but by the early 
1990s all states and territories were calling upon the BCA in their primary building regulations 
for the construction of buildings, thus legally enforcing its use. 
At about the same time, the agreement that led to the AUBRCC was undergoing a 
strengthening on the back of a COAG report that showed inefficiencies in current building 
practices were costing the nation up to a billion dollars annually (Australian Building Codes 
Board 2009). This process led to the creation of a national governing board, the Australian 
Building Code Board (ABCB), which was charged with the continual improvement of the BCA 
(Australian Building Codes Board 2009): 
In essence, the new agreement set in place a co-operative arrangement 
between the Commonwealth, state and territory Governments, Local 
Government and the various elements of the building industry to achieve 
nationally consistent performance-based building regulatory systems that 
w[ere] efficient and met community, industry and national needs.  
The ABCB’s first role was to develop the current BCA into a more performance-based code, 
so that designers had more flexibility to build more cost-effective structures than the 1990 
edition allowed. This new version was released in 1996 and accepted by the regulatory bodies 
of all states and territories by early 1998. Revisions of the BCA were originally released 
biannually; they are now released annually.  
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With the introduction of the 2002 edition of AS1170, the responsibility of determining a 
suitable level of design risk was transferred from the standards committee to the ABCB. This 
transfer occurred because the level of risk assumed by the occupant of a building is a public 
policy decision, best determined by governments and not the technical committee that write 
standards (Pham 2007). The separation of policy and technical decisions, although not an 
issue for countries where standards are written by their government bodies, is an issue for 
Australia given that our standards are produced by a committee of volunteers for a corporate 
entity. The separation of risk levels from the standard is logical, and in theory represents a 
system where governing bodies can be held accountable by their constituents for lax levels of 
assigned risk.  
Pham (2007) highlights a secondary role played by the BCA: the checking of standards. The 
role of referencing standards by the BCA is in effect the only independent checking 
mechanism available to ensure that standards do not breach any government policies, such 
as competition policy or the Trade Practices Act. This is an important role that has seemingly 
received little attention historically. Again, this is not an issue when standards are written by 
government authorities, and in the early days when standards were largely written by DHC 
employees a form of self-checking would seemingly have been in place. Today, however, with 
the dwindling funding that goes to standards committees, it is not too hard to imagine that 
vested interests may become an issue. It is also the role of the committee itself to self-
regulate in order to ensure that these types of interests are not introduced. Pham (2007) 
suggests that the checking role of the ABCB will increase in the future, and that even today, 
some Standards Australia documents are being replaced in the BCA reference list by those 
written by competing organizations, provided they demonstrate their willingness to comply 
with regulations designed to protect the public interest. 
The current BCA (Australian Building Codes Board 2009) calls upon AS1170 Part 2 and 
AS4055 for the specification of load calculations throughout the country. To determine the 
level of risk to which a given building should be designed, the building use and level of hazard 
to occupants and other buildings must be assessed. From this information, an importance 
level is assigned. Based on the importance level, a return period for design is determined. For 
general structures or housing, an importance level of 2 is obtained, which leads to the BCA 
recommending that a minimum return period of 500 years be used for ultimate wind loading. 
Building Certification 
As discussed in Section 3.3, pre-Tracy certification of housing was performed by certifiers 
from the local council. Generally, these inspectors were builders without a strict engineering 
background. For much of the period since Tracy, this remained the same – though in the 
immediate aftermath of Tracy the levels of inspection throughout Darwin would most likely 
have risen. In the late 1990s, citing potential improvements in speed and efficiency, the 
certification process was opened up to private enterprise and private certifiers who could 
compete with council certifiers for work. At this point, many council certifiers became private 
certifiers. 
In general, the current practice for building certification, once a certifier is appointed, is:  
x review and comment on plan 
x issuance of building permits 
x inspections, and 
x issuance of occupancy certificate. (Lampert 1999) 
The number and extent of inspections vary between states and territories, but in many cases 
multiple inspections are involved throughout the construction phase. Irrespective of whether 
certification is done through local council or private sector certifiers, reports are required to be 
submitted at each stage of the process so regulating authorities can ensure legality (Lampert 
1999).  
The process itself is relatively solid – the issues that arise are with ensuring certifiers actually 
do the job they’re supposed to. With the introduction of private certification came the concept 
of ‘project teams’, where the certifier is included at the design phase of a project so their 
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expertise can be utilised and redesign costs minimised (Lampert 1999). In theory, this is a 
good concept and is seemingly encouraged by authorities. However, the role of a certifier in 
the building process is one of an impartial third party, and this must be ensured in their 
assessments. As part of a team, this may be questioned. The issue of impartiality is further 
compromised by the reality that in many cases the certifier is engaged by the builder. With this 
scenario, builders are free to choose a certifier who is perceived as ‘easy’ (relying on their 
insurance if something goes wrong) and the opportunity for collusion can and does exist (L 
Pham, pers. comm., 3 December 2009).  
As Lampert (1999) points out, the opportunity for corruption is not limited to the practice of 
building certification, and was already an issue before privatisation. Certifier audits are a 
measure used to minimise this practice. The current certification system is not ideal; however 
conceptually, if enforceable and if inspections are made at enough suitable times (this is 
important so that major structural elements and connections can be assessed), it is 
reasonable. In an attempt to clean up some of the perceived conflicts of interest, Lampert 
(1999) suggests: 
It should be a requirement that the building certifier be engaged (and paid) 
directly by the owner, not by an agent of the owner (such as the builder) … 
Such an arrangement would more clearly establish the role of the certifier in 
protecting the owner against poor building design or practice. This is not 
intended to detract from the important role of the certifier in the project team; 
however, the certifier should not be subservient to the team. 
This suggestion would reduce some of the potential conflicts, but of course would not rule 
them out completely. 
The issue of education of certifiers raised after Tracy has also improved with specified tertiary-
level education required for all certifiers (Building Surveying). Specified periods of work 
experience are also enforced to obtain certification grades. The problem with certifiers not 
understanding all the complex structural responses or implications their inspections are in 
principle assessing is not entirely addressed with these educational provisions, but unless 
structural engineers start to become certifiers, it is likely that this will continue to be the case. 
Despite this, the importance of continued education of both certifiers and builders on this issue 
by structural engineers cannot be understated. 
5.1.3 Reflection 
Wind damage 
Despite the number of positive adaptations made to wind-resistant design and construction 
methods since Tracy, there are still changes that can be made to help improve resilience of 
structures to cyclonic wind loading. A brief summary of some currently unresolved issues is 
provided in this section. Several items highlighted are conceptual issues without immediate 
solutions, while others have more practical responses. 
x Department of Housing and Construction. Walker (2004) asks the question: Who 
would replace the DHC in the post-disaster adaptation process in the event of a 
disaster of Tracy’s magnitude today? The DHC played a huge part in the immediate 
post-Tracy adaptation process, and, of significant importance, accepted responsibility 
for the disaster. This meant that a single organisation (although others were involved) 
was compelled, equipped and funded to determine the reasons why failures occurred, 
and then obliged by government promises to find solutions to these problems. Given 
its position in the construction industry, particularly in Darwin, the DHC had the power 
to implement these solutions.  
It is hard to imagine today that a group would – or probably should – accept 
responsibility for a disaster in the same way the DHC did. It is, however, important 
that a group of people is kept ready to react in a similar manner to the DHC’s 
response after Tracy. For the initial damage assessment, organisations like the 
Cyclone Testing Station (CTS) at James Cook University (often with the backing of 
the Australian Building Code Board) and Geoscience Australia seem to be filling this 
role. The CTS, along with other academics and consultants throughout the country, 
also has the knowledge to perform analyses to address issues raised during the 
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assessment. The numbers of academics/researchers in this area are, however, 
dwindling. To ensure implementation, the ABCB would be required to make changes 
to the BCA and have the state governments accept these amendments. Under 
normal circumstances, this process is long and time-consuming. It is, however, 
expected that in the aftermath of a disaster, pressure would exist for this process to 
be fast-tracked, particularly if the (political) decision had again been made to suspend 
reconstruction. 
x Decay of structural integrity. Given that all processes are followed, a new home is 
certified to the fact that at the point in time of initial occupancy the home satisfies all 
regulations in regard to safety. What is not addressed, however, is whether the 
elements that have gone into constructing the home will survive the life of the 
structure. For example, a building will pass inspection if it designed for a notional life 
of 50 years but uses material that will only last 20 years. This becomes more of an 
issue in coastal regions, where corrosion further reduces the lifespan of elements. 
The reason that this scenario is currently acceptable is because the Building Code of 
Australia does not define durability in its regulations, based on the idea that it is a 
consumer choice issue (L Pham, pers. comm., 3 December 2009). The concept of 
lifetime inspections for housing should be considered – particularly in cyclone regions. 
There are significant issues with this concept, given the inaccessibility of most 
connections and members in a building once it has been constructed. This issue is, 
however, not considered insurmountable. The concept raised by Leicester and 
Reardon (2008) of an easily inspected anchor structure is particularly amenable to 
this concept. On this issue, it is also advisable that those doing probabilistic risk 
modelling of cyclonic winds incorporate decay in structural integrity into their 
vulnerability modelling. 
x Retrospective code enforcement. It is the case that when changes are implemented 
into codes or standards, their application is only mandatory for buildings built after that 
point. This does not address the issue of weakness in those buildings constructed 
prior to that point in time. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future retrospective 
codes will exist, so other measures are required to ensure the continual upgrade of 
structural strength to a level currently deemed suitable. One means of achieving this 
is through the use of banded insurance payments. In this type of scheme those who 
upgrade their buildings to current regulations will receive reductions in their insurance 
premiums. This provides an incentive for owners to upgrade. This scenario was at 
one time tabled (G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009), to the extent that pricing 
guidelines were developed. The concept did not take off, however, because insurance 
companies feared they would lose business if the system were voluntary. It is felt that 
this issue still has merit and should be reinvestigated.  
x Compatibility of standards. As discussed in this document, there are several 
differences between the governing wind loading standard and the housing wind 
loading standard. These should be streamlined so that performing the same 
calculation with each produces the same design result. To achieve this, there needs 
to be better communication between the two Standards committees. 
x Design wind speeds. The wind speed specified by a wind loading standard is 
perhaps the most uncertain component of the entire design process (J Holmes, pers. 
comm., 3 December 2009). As such, continual reassessment of these values should 
be made. This should be done through analysis of historic wind speed records and 
through probabilistic risk modelling. The largest barrier to this systematically occurring 
is that there is no explicit funding provided for it to happen. If the most appropriate 
wind speeds are desired for design throughout the country, monies should be made 
available for this analysis to occur on a regular basis. At present, updates are 
generally only made when private practitioners or researchers provide their results to 
the standards committee free of charge.
x Cyclonic wind speed measurement. The sparse network of wind-monitoring 
stations around cyclone regions of the country should be improved. This would 
provide much-needed validation for probabilistic risk models attempting to determine 
accurate cyclone risk calculations, and would provide better guidance for the 
determination of wind speed multipliers in cyclone events (see below).  
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x Wind speed multipliers. In general, the wind speed multipliers prescribed in the 
standard were developed for large-scale synoptic type wind storms. These storms 
differ from tropical cyclone in structure; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
effect on wind speed profiles (accounted for in the standard by multipliers) will also 
differ. Throughout the world, there is a lack of understanding of this area of wind 
engineering. Further research is recommended (J Holmes, pers. comm., 3 December 
2009). 
x Internal pressures. In cyclone regions, it is a requirement that all buildings be 
designed for full internal pressurisation. This is not the case for housing in non-
cyclonic regions. However, the subsequent increase in loading that occurs when an 
envelope breach occurs is identical, irrespective of what type of wind storm induces it. 
The necessity for enforcement of design for full internal pressurisation in non-cyclonic 
regions should be investigated (Walker 2004; Leitch et al. 2009). 
x Roller doors. In almost all post-wind event damage assessments, there are reported 
cases of roller door failure. Failure of a roller door often leads to the scenario where a 
dominant opening exists on a windward face that was not accounted for in the design 
of the building. The specifications for installation of domestic garage doors should be 
tested for their adequacy (Leitch et al. 2009).  
x Developing a strong envelope. The main goal of many post-Tracy modifications to 
the wind standard was to ensure the roof was not lost from the building. The loss of 
roofing material that occurred during Tracy was a primary cause of progressive 
failures that occurred. In principle, the wind loading standard (AS1170 Part 2) sets out 
two acceptable scenarios for a building to effectively keep its roof on. First, it can be 
designed to withstand (or at least increase the chances of withstanding) any envelope 
penetration by designing potential openings to withstand impact from flying debris 
through use of, for example, impact-resistant glass or window protection. Second, a 
building can be designed for full internal pressurisation loading if the resilience of 
potential openings cannot be ensured (design for full internal pressure is a 
requirement for housing). The result of both design methods is that the roof stays on 
the building and structural integrity is maintained. However, the second case leaves a 
structure open to the elements where water ingress and the danger of flying debris 
entering the building are significantly amplified. This scenario potentially increases the 
losses to an occupant due to increased contents damage. With time, this is becoming 
more of an issue, given that the ratio of contents to home value is increasing. A cost-
benefit analysis should be performed to assess the consequences of allowing 
envelope penetration. Innovative methods for window protection should also be 
investigated, and studies into the safety implications of allowing debris to enter 
buildings should be conducted. 
x Thunderstorm winds. Though not discussed in this report, the wind standard 
requires further specification for design against thunderstorm wind gusts. At present in 
the Australian (and almost all worldwide) standard, atmospheric boundary layer wind 
characteristics are applied for the design of buildings in regions where thunderstorm 
wind gusts produce the design wind speed. This is generally the case because the 
wind engineering community does not understand these phenomena with enough 
certainty to include them in its standards. This should be rectified through further 
research, both in laboratories and at full scale. 
Despite this list, it is still the case that the wind-resistant provisions developed and enforced in 
this country are among the best in the world. To ensure this continues, increased funding is 
required for research and innovation in a field that has received little over the last 20 years 
(Power & Pearce 2007).  
It should also be remembered that even if compliance to the wind standard is achieved and 
the engineering performs to expectations, building failure may still result if wind speeds 
exceed design strength. The decision about the level of safety that is suitable is a public 
safety decision and must be made by a public body, in this case the Australian Building Codes 
Board. These decisions extend beyond the scope of this report, but we note that there is 
always a trade-off between building cost and likelihood of exceeding building design strength. 
More extreme wind speeds are certainly possible within the bounds of natural variability, and 
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may in the future be aggravated by global climate change. At least for the immediate future, 
current wind standard specifications are considered acceptable. 
Storm surge 
Cyclone Tracy was a wind event. Despite the potential for storm surge and flooding 
accompanying tropical cyclones, these perils were not significant in Tracy. Given that this 
report is a case study on Cyclone Tracy and the specific lessons learnt from that event, we 
describe the impact of a single cyclonic event and the potential impact of similar (i.e. wind) 
events. This report does not attempt to deal with all cyclonic events and all hazards – 
speculating about lessons that could have been learnt had surge or flooding been an issue 
lies outside the scope of this study.  
Notwithstanding these observations, the issue of water inundation (rainfall or surge) is 
extremely important and must be addressed by engineers designing homes to withstand the 
impact of climatic extremes, government agencies specifying appropriate land-use regulations 
and emergency managers determining appropriate disaster-management strategies. 
Improving structural resistance to wind loading does not implicitly improve a structure’s 
resistance to storm surge or wave action. Specification of wind resistance changes have, 
however, always been done in a way that does not increase the surge risk. For example, in-
residence shelters are not widely mandated because although these rooms may ensure safety 
during high winds, they would be highly inappropriate if the building were located in a surge 
zone. 
It is important that the difference between wind resistance and overall cyclonic resistance is 
understood by those living in cyclonic regions. Where surge is a risk, this hazard must be 
explicitly designed for (i.e. water and wave loading, appropriate floor levels) and appropriate 
evacuation procedures put in place if structural safety cannot be assured. Unlike wind loading, 
where a structure is almost immediately safely occupiable if it survives the passage of a 
storm, even if a structure withstands the impact of surge or flooding, it is likely to be unfit for 
occupation because of retained water and all the associated physical and biological hazards 
that go with this. This being the case, a home may not be a suitable refuge even if designed to 
withstand the physical storm loading. In these cases, life preservation can only be assured 
through evacuation.  
A corollary to this is that the need for evacuations can largely be ignored outside of surge 
zones as long as the structural integrity of shelter (including housing) can be assured. It was 
the general consensus of those interviewed during this research that current wind resistant 
regulations ensure this, not for all possible events but to a level of risk deemed appropriate by 
state authorities. 
6. The cost of Cyclone Tracy 
6.1 Introduction 
The first natural disaster event in Australia for which we have credible estimates of insurance 
industry losses is the 1967 Hobart bushfires. At the time, the insured loss from this event was 
$14 million. During the early 1970s, though, Cyclone Ada in the Whitsunday Islands caused 
an insured loss of $12 million, Althea led to $25 million in losses in Townsville, Madge caused 
$30 million in losses to parts of Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia, 
and the 1974 Brisbane floods, caused by Cyclone Wanda, led to the largest loss to date with 
an insurance bill of $68 million.  
Losses from the 1974 Brisbane floods were greater than the combined loss of the three 
cyclones that had occurred in the previous few years, so this event came as a significant 
shock to the insurance industry, leaving many questioning its capacity to deal with natural 
disasters (Walker 2009). Walker (2009) suggests that at the time there was little 
understanding of the true exposure, and that maximum estimated event losses were often 
calculated by simply taking the largest previous loss and multiplying it by a factor of two or 
three.  
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Despite the significance of the 1974 Brisbane floods, Cyclone Tracy would eclipse all previous 
events and set a new benchmark for the industry’s perception of likely losses, not only in 
Australia but throughout much of the insured world. The following discusses the implications 
that this event has had on the insurance industry and its capacity to deal with events of this 
nature today. Much of what follows is taken from Walker (2009). 
6.2 The cost of Tracy 
According to the Insurance Council of Australia’s (ICA) Natural Disaster Event List, Cyclone 
Tracy cost the insurance industry an estimated $200 million.1 Of this cost, approximately 38% 
was borne by the insurance and reinsurance industries within Australia and the remainder by 
foreign reinsurance companies (Cole 1977). As reported in Section 6.2, this is the estimated 
cost to the insurance industry and does not reflect the overall economic cost of the event to 
Darwin, its people or to the Commonwealth. 
At the time of Tracy, Darwin had some unique features that will have influenced the insured 
loss for the event. This issue was addressed in Section 6.1, but is further expanded here. The 
three significant factors germane to estimating the cost of Tracy are changes in building 
ownership that have occurred in Darwin since 1974, the issue of underinsurance and the role 
of post-disaster inflation (demand surge) at the time of the original event. These factors are 
discussed briefly below. 
6.2.1 Change in ownership 
When Tracy hit Darwin, a significant number of buildings were owned and occupied by the 
government. In 1974 the government owned approximately 40 per cent of all housing (the 
total number of houses was approximately 8000), and also owned about 20 per cent of 
apartments (total number approximately 3000). As is general practice, the government self-
insured its buildings, and therefore did not utilise private insurance to cover its risk. This 
means that no losses to government buildings are accounted for in the $200 million insured 
loss figure.  
Today, almost all housing is privately owned and only a small percentage of apartments are 
still owned by the government. In 1974, the government also owned and occupied a small 
percentage of commercial and industrial buildings (5 per cent), whereas today the government 
leases all the buildings it uses and so has almost zero ownership of the total building stock 
(Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009). What this means is that with the higher private 
ownership of buildings today, we must assume that the penetration of private insurance will be 
much greater and in the event of a recurrence insured losses would surely be greater. An 
attempt to quantitatively describe this change in ownership is made in the main document. 
6.2.2 Under-insurance 
An ASIC report (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2005) suggests that 
building contents are systematically under-insured because of an ignorance of the true value 
of these items. This was the case during Tracy and remains true today. This said, it is unlikely 
to be a significant factor is deriving a normalised loss value for the event, but does highlight a 
problem that exists for building owners.  
6.2.3 Post-disaster inflation 
At the time of Tracy, buildings were insured for the cost of their replacement under normal 
working conditions. In the aftermath of disasters, however, this value may be significantly less 
than what the actual replacement costs will be. One reason for this is that the cost of materials 
and labour often rises because of the need for these to be brought in from other locations. The 
result is that there is a significant increase in the cost of reconstruction relative to the cost of 
labour and materials before the event. The isolated location of Darwin meant that post-
disaster inflation was a significant issue for the reconstruction of the city, with house prices 
increasing by approximately 100 per cent to between $35 000 and $45 000 over the pre-Tracy 
cost of $20 000 to $25 000 (Darwin Reconstruction Study Group 1975; Cole 1977). Only part 
                                                     
1EmergencyManagement(2006)reportstheinsuredlossofTracyas$837million.ThisappearstobeaquasiͲ
normalisedfigureto1993values.
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of this jump (approximately $5000) can be attributed to the increased building cost imposed by 
more stringent wind-resistant design (G Reardon, pers. comm., 5 November 2009; Cole 
1977).  
Post-disaster inflation is variable between locations and different types of disasters. Inflation is 
also dependent upon the state of the building industry at the time. The inflation observed 
during Tracy, however, was much greater than could be expected in any other, more 
accessible location. Importantly, the increased strength of buildings in respect to wind loading, 
and thus the significantly lower expected damage, should mean that post-event inflation would 
be more constrained in the event of a repeat of a Tracy-like event. Walker (pers. comm., 28 
October 2009) suggests a value of 20–30 per cent. If more people start taking out policies that 
account for post disaster inflation, however, insured losses will increase systematically. 
With these points under consideration, Walker (2009) suggests that the true total cost of 
Cyclone Tracy was of the order of $500–$600 million (in 1974 dollars). This value includes 
$200 million paid out by the Commonwealth to rebuild government homes and pay assistance 
grants.  
The Commonwealth Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE) also attempted to estimate the 
total economic cost of Cyclone Tracy in 2001 values, albeit with the caveat of significant 
approximation (Bureau of Transport Economics 2001). This report attempts to account for 
direct and indirect cost as well as attributing monetary values to the loss of life and injury 
(intangible cost). In doing this, it was found that the direct cost of Cyclone Tracy (1974 dollars) 
was approximately $330 million, the indirect cost approximately $80 million and the intangible 
cost approximately $27 million. The combined direct and indirect cost of $410 million is 
roughly comparable to Walker’s estimate of $500–$600 million, again indicating a true cost of 
the event in excess of twice the insured losses. The BTE also attempts to normalise its loss 
data to predict the true cost of a recurrence today (1999 in this case). Unfortunately the 
approximately $1800 million value at which it arrived used CPI to update the estimated costs 
of both destroyed and damaged homes to 1999 and then assumed zero inflation for the years 
to 2001. In other words, considerable increases in wealth and population were neglected 
(Crompton & McAneney 2008). This being the case, it is difficult to have much confidence in 
the figures’ normalised value. 
6.3 Insurance response to Tracy 
Much of this section is drawn reasonably faithfully from Walker (2009), who to the knowledge 
of the authors is one of the few to have commented on the insurance response to Tracy. 
However, we begin with Cole (1977) who reports: ‘As far as I can determine, Insurance 
Companies rose to the occasion in the Darwin situation.’ 
Dawn Lawrie (in Cole 1977) suggests of the insurance companies: 
Some were very good and some were dreadful … the insurance companies 
hang out and hang out until you are desperate for the money and offer you half 
of your entitlement and because you are desperate you take it … after the 
cyclone some companies demonstrated their avaricious and wrong attitude by 
intensifying that type of activity. 
The largest complaint seemed to be related to the effects of post-disaster inflation not being 
accounted for in insurance policies. This meant that even when insured homes were fully paid 
out, the home owner was left to cover approximately half the reconstruction costs. For 
uninsured home owners, the government passed the Darwin Cyclone Damage Compensation 
Act in May 1975, which allowed owners/occupants to claim 50 per cent of the pre-cyclone 
home and contents value up to respective limits of $25 000 and $5000 from the government 
purse. Although politically this was the right thing to do, it also provided a free form of 
insurance and a disincentive for people to cover their personal exposure to extreme events. 
There will, of course, always be those who cannot afford private insurance, but given that the 
government allocation was not means tested, those who could have afforded insurance but 
chose not to take it were not isolated.  
Today, some insurance companies offer the option of insuring for post-disaster inflation. As an 
example, at the time of writing, several insurance companies (including some operating in 
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Darwin) were offering an optional extra to insure for coverage of up to 30 per cent higher than 
the insured cost of a home. Of course, this will be recouped through the additional charge to a 
customer’s premium, but it clearly indicates the industry’s acknowledgement of the risk. 
Cyclone Tracy had an impact on both the local insurance industry and the international 
reinsurance industry. This occurred because the magnitude of losses experienced was far in 
excess of what either of these industries felt the probable maximum loss (PML) could be for a 
natural catastrophe in this country (Walker 2009). Although no major failures occurred, many 
insurance companies were stretched significantly, with reinsurance levels exceeded in some 
cases and reserves required to fulfil payments. For the reinsurance industry, the level of 
cyclone risk in Australia was increased significantly, and with it so too were reinsurance 
premiums paid by insurers. The increased premium, however, was not only to cover the 
increased level of risk, but – as was the practice at the time – for the reinsurance companies 
to recoup the money paid out to insurers over a period of several years.  
Just prior to Tracy, and based on the run of insured losses during the early 1970s, the 
insurance industry declared that some of the hazards it was currently covering were, in effect, 
uninsurable (Walker 2008). To investigate this further, a committee was set up to explore the 
feasibility of developing a natural disaster insurance scheme backed by the Commonwealth. 
This investigation led to the realisation that under the current system of insurance, the risk of 
both flood and earthquakes meant the nation was uninsurable. Cyclones were a notable 
exception to this list. The investigation recommended that the Commonwealth set up a fund 
so that, in the event of a major disaster, any shortfall not covered by reinsurance would be 
picked up by government funds. Funding for the scheme was to be through a levy on all 
general insurance policies. The reasoning for a scheme such as this was to guarantee that, in 
the event of a major disaster, the insurance system as a whole remained solvent (Walker 
2008). This recommendation was made in October 1974. 
Walker (2009) reports: 
How much notice the government would have taken of the committee’s 
suggestion if Cyclone Tracy had not occurred will never be known. In the 
aftermath of Cyclone Tracy, and its severe impacts on many insurance 
companies, the government took little convincing that it was not in the national 
interest to expect the private insurance industry to bear such risk and thus put 
the whole insurance industry at risk of insolvency. 
So in the aftermath of Tracy, a working party was put together and several years of intense 
research across a wide range of industries ensued. This was an important period for disaster 
management in Australia because it alerted the insurance industry to the wealth of expertise 
in the country’s universities and research organisations. To this point, the industry had been 
acting in isolation, but it rapidly became aware of what these researchers did and how they 
could help manage risk more efficiently. Since this time, the insurance industry’s dependence 
on scientific and technical expertise to facilitate better financing of catastrophe risk has 
increased continuously (Walker 2008). Walker (pers. comm., 28 October 2009) does, 
however, suggest that this partnership is not as strong as it should be. 
Despite all the good work, no natural disaster scheme eventuated. This seems to have 
occurred because in the six years following Tracy, the absence of any significant insurance 
losses allowed insurance companies to replenish their reserves, and allowed the general 
public to adjust to higher levels of premium charged by insurance companies to cover the 
increase in reinsurance costs (Walker 2008). The decision not to implement a national 
disaster scheme was aided by changes in government attitudes on its role in private industry 
(Leigh et al. 2009), with the then Treasurer, John Howard, citing reasons including that ‘the 
scheme would be inappropriate on budgetary, technical and insurance grounds’ (Howard 
1979) and that 
such a scheme would be inconsistent with a basic tenet in [the government’s] 
political philosophy – namely that governments and government authorities 
should … avoid intervention in matters that can be left to the private sector.  
Governments have come and gone since then, but the ‘hands-off’ approach remains and 
there is still no nationally uniform approach to natural disaster insurance. This, in effect, has 
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meant that the insurance industry has had to deal with the issue itself – and has felt that it 
could.  
6.4 Insurance today 
As discussed in the previous section, the insurance industry has become increasingly 
dependent on science and modelling to better manage its exposure to natural catastrophes. In 
essence, what science has done is allow the insurance industry to make more rational 
decisions about its exposure to risk and the methods it uses to manage this risk through 
reserves and reinsurance.  
The first major improvement came with the development of the zone accumulation method in 
the late 1970s. This method took scientific information about a specific hazard to determine 
zones that could be impacted by a single catastrophic event. Within each zone, an estimate of 
the PML could be calculated for a given level of event and be presented as a PML factor – 
which is simply the ratio of the event PML to the total insured value of the zone. Using this 
information, insurance companies could assess their risk in a particular area and purchase 
reinsurance based on this information. This method also allowed premiums paid to insurance 
companies to be aligned with the risk at a specific location, meaning that individuals began to 
pay more appropriate prices for their exposure to hazards. This was in contrast to the 
historical approach, where all people over large areas paid identical insurance premiums, with 
those in relatively unexposed areas covering some of the risk of those in more exposed 
locales (G Walker, pers. comm., 28 October 2009). For over 20 years, the zone accumulation 
method was the mainstay of insurance company catastrophe loss risk management in 
Australia, and is still used in many countries around the world (Walker 2008). 
The next improvement came in the early 1990s, when GIS-based catastrophe risk models 
began to be used widely. These models use statistical information about hazard events and 
mathematically simulate long-duration synthetic data sets. These models are ever evolving, 
and with the advent of faster computing systems continually allow more detailed scientific 
information to be included in their calculations. The advantage of using catastrophe models 
over simply analysing historic data sets, such as in the zone accumulation approach, is that 
whole-of-portfolio losses can be suitably determined, leading to more appropriate levels of 
reinsurance purchase and less fluctuation in reinsurance premiums. Another product of the 
introduction of catastrophe models is, in theory, a more precise estimate of localised risk and 
the ability to price exposure as such.  
In very recent times, alternative risk-transfer products have been developed to complement 
reinsurance in high-risk concentration regions where reinsurance is prohibitively expensive 
(e.g. hurricane- and tornado-prone areas of the United States). For Australia, however, Walker 
(pers. comm., 28 October 2009) suggests that reinsurance is a suitable mechanism to cover 
most catastrophe scenarios, given that on a global scale our PML is relatively small.  
Walker (2008, 2009) concludes by saying: 
One consequence of Cyclone Tracy is that Australians began paying a much 
larger amount of money each year for protection from damage from 
catastrophic events through insurance premiums … Australians began paying 
a more realistic price in relation to the risk. 
with the further observation: 
Had Cyclone Tracy not occurred the Australian insurance industry would by 
now have been using technical expertise, but instead of being a worldwide 
leader it is more likely that it would have been a follower. 
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7. Tracy today 
In this section, we review two studies that attempt to estimate the impact on Darwin if Cyclone 
Tracy were to recur in Darwin today. The first, a study by Crompton and McAneney (2008) of 
natural disaster losses since 1967, involves the normalisation of insured loss data from the 
Insurance Council of Australia’s Natural Disaster List (Insurance Council of Australia 2009). 
The process attempts to normalise the insured monetary losses of the day with what the 
expected loss would be given present societal conditions. 
The second study, Arthur et al. (2008), employs the Geoscience Australia statistical tropical 
cyclone loss model to recreate Tracy’s path. Using current building stock information and 
estimated wind speed/damage relationships, the extent of building damage under a repeat 
event is predicted. This study focuses on building losses and reports results as a change in 
damage ratios (Section 4.1), as for the DHC damage survey.  
7.1 Normalised insurance loss 
The Insurance Council of Australia’s (ICA) Natural Disaster Event List puts the insured loss 
from Cyclone Tracy at $200 million. This nicely rounded number is an estimation based on 
reported insurance losses, but is not a representation of the total economic cost of the event 
(many of the buildings were government owned and would have been included in this figure). 
In the following analysis, the assumption is made that insurance companies paid out to the 
limit of the policies rather than fully addressing the effect of demand surge that, in effect, 
almost doubled the cost of rebuilding.  
The objective of Crompton and McAneney (2008) was to normalise insurance industry losses 
due to meteorological disasters since the beginning of the ICA database, 1967. By doing this, 
they estimate what a repeat event would inflict given 2006 societal conditions. As such, 
Cyclone Tracy was only one of 156 weather-related hazard events in the database and, as the 
authors were aiming for a standard simple-to-apply methodology for all of these, they 
deliberately did not seek event-specific adjustments. Nonetheless, given the iconic status of 
Tracy and its importance in terms of historical losses, some re-evaluation of this event is 
relevant here.   
The normalisation procedure begins with the ICA loss value and applies factors to account for 
changes in the number of occupied dwellings (Ni,j) and in the average nominal value of new 
dwellings (Di,k, on a state basis) since the time when each event occurred. In the case of 
tropical cyclones, a further adjustment, Btc, was applied to account for increases in structural 
resilience due to changes adopted in the Australian wind loading standard. This tropical 
cyclone adjustment is based on the proportion of the losses attributable to wind loading, the 
maximum event gust wind speed, the proportion of structures in the given area that utilise 
post-Tracy wind-resistant design and the relationship between wind speed and the proportion 
of destruction derived by Walker (1995). In the original work, a blanket assumption was made 
that wind-resistant design was introduced across all cyclone-prone regions in 1981. As 
discussed already, this does not apply to Darwin, where implementation began during the 
reconstruction efforts. 
The normalised loss value for a given event is calculated using: 
 
(2) 
where L06 is the normalised insured loss in the year 2006, and Li is the insured loss at the time 
of the event (1974 in the case of Tracy). Results for Cyclone Tracy are given in Table 4:4 and 
show a normalised value in 2006 of $3650 million. Table 4 also shows that if we were to 
ignore the additional tropical cyclone adjustment, the estimated loss is roughly doubled to 
$7140 million. This highlights the significant improvements made by the introduction of wind 
resistant provisions in the Australian Standard.  
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Table 4: Normalised losses for Cyclone Tracy 
 
Source: Crompton & McAneney (2008). 
Given the previous discussion, an attempt is made to improve upon the Crompton and 
McAneney (2008) estimate for a repeat of Tracy by making some of the broad assumptions 
made by the authors more Darwin-specific (refer to Appendix 2 for a wider discussion of the 
following points). There are still some significant simplifications in the updated approach, but it 
is felt that this new analysis is more representative for this given case. 
First, since 1974 the extent of government ownership of housing in Darwin has changed 
significantly. As discussed in Section 3.2, in 1974 approximately 40 per cent of homes and 20 
per cent of flats were government owned and therefore not insured through private insurance. 
Thus insurers were spared significant losses as the government self-insured its assets against 
catastrophe losses.  
To get a rough idea of how much more this event might have cost insurers had the 
government not been such a significant player in the building market (as it isn’t today), the 
original $200 million can be adjusted and the normalisation of Crompton and McAneney done 
on this updated value. In particular, we know that the government paid out some $310 million 
in total to cover the cost of rebuilding government-owned buildings (about $250 million) and 
also in special payouts for those without insurance (about $60 million) (Cole 1977). The 
former would have included the effect of demand surge via an increase in the costs of goods 
and materials, which has been estimated by Walker (2009) to be around 100 per cent. 
Payouts to non-insured were capped at 50 per cent of the pre-Tracy home and contents 
values, however, so would not have been inflated by demand surge. In an attempt to bring 
these values to equivalent insured values (i.e. value of building without demand surge), 
crudely using the 100 per cent inflation value, the $250 million is reduced by half to $125 
million, while the $60 million is doubled to $120 million to account for the 50 per cent cap on 
government payout (this now assumes 100 per cent of property owners have taken out 
insurance). Summing these two and combining with the original $200 million insured loss, a 
rough combined figure of $445 million is found for a notional insurance property loss assuming 
dominance of the private sector. This is a very coarse assumption, but given all the other 
uncertainties inherent in this kind of calculation it is not unwarranted. 
A second issue that will influence the normalised loss is that a significant proportion of 
Darwin’s housing population was rebuilt in the period between 1975 and 1981 (the latter being 
the threshold year used by Crompton and McAneney (2009) for the ‘national’ implementation 
of wind-resistant design); thus the percentage of buildings utilising the wind-resistant standard 
in the original analysis will be severely under-estimated. According to Arthur et al. (2008), the 
percentage of current housing in Darwin not utilising cyclone wind-resistant design is 
approximately 1 per cent. The ‘pre-1981’ percentage given in Table 4:4 is therefore updated to 
represent this. 
A third issue that we do not address here is that of the vulnerability curves used by the 
authors. The use of a single curve for this analysis is another approximation, given that retrofit 
homes, those constructed between 1975 and 1980, and those built to the Australian wind 
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standard will all have differing vulnerability curves, so are not strictly represented by the single 
curve used in the analysis (not to mention buildings of different design and material). 
However, for current purposes, use of a single curve is considered acceptable given that it is 
probably a reasonable middle ground for the comparatively weaker retrofit homes and 
stronger 1975–80 homes. 
In an attempt to incorporate some of the Darwin-specific modifications, with the aid of 
R Crompton (pers. comm., 25 January 2010), the Cyclone Tracy figures were reanalysed with 
the updated insured loss and the earlier introduction of wind-resistant design considered. 
From this reanalysis, an insured loss of approximately $2250 million (2006 value) is 
calculated. The reduction from the originally estimated $3650 million is primarily attributed to 
the enhanced building standards being implemented in Darwin much earlier than originally 
considered. Comparing the modified normalised value with $7140 million estimated in the 
absence of any changes to the wind standard, an approximate 72 per cent reduction in 
potential losses is found, all of which can be attributed to the improvements in wind-resistant 
design introduced since Tracy. 
7.2 Scenario loss model 
Arthur et al. (2008) used GeoScience Australia’s Tropical Cyclone Risk Model (TCRM) to 
simulate the impacts of Cyclone Tracy on Darwin under current societal conditions. TCRM 
was developed to run as a statistical loss model using historic cyclone observations to 
develop estimates of cyclonic risk around the Australian coast (Arthur et al. 2008). Using the 
model in a deterministic mode, individual storm data can be input and estimates of resulting 
damage obtained for an individual scenario. 
The TCRM follows a two-step procedure to determine the estimated wind field for the 
recurrence of Tracy. Using the Bureau of Meteorology’s ‘best track’ geospatial and 
meteorological data for the event, the near surface wind field was developed using a two-
dimensional gradient wind model along with a boundary layer wind field model to introduce 
asymmetry (Holland 1980; Kepert 2001). These calculations were performed on a grid of 
approximately 1 km resolution. Wind field multipliers were introduced into calculations at each 
specific location in order to incorporate the influence of terrain, topography and shielding. 
These multipliers serve to speed up or slow down ground-level wind speeds based on the 
local surface characteristics (Section 4.3), with multipliers calculated at a 25 m resolution 
based on the Australian wind loading standard (Standards Australia 2002). Use of engineering 
multipliers is not an ideal approach, as the natural conservatism written into standards leads 
to an over-estimation of the impact of specific features. This shortcoming is acknowledged by 
the authors and is in the process of being improved (C Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009). 
When running the model with 1974 societal conditions, Figure 22 displays the predicted 
maximum near-ground wind field for the duration of the event. Comparing predicted peak wind 
speed at the airport anemometer site with that estimated from the partial anemograph 
(Section 0), the prediction of 72 m/s aligns well. This is an encouraging validation for the wind 
field model. Assessing the remainder of the wind field, wind speeds are seen to the north of 
the eye track (small black symbols) to be greater than to the south, and to slow significantly as 
they transition to flow over a rougher surface after landfall. There are however, still areas of 
Darwin’s northern suburbs that show wind speeds over 75 m/s, as north-westerly winds off the 
ocean meet relatively open land upwind of the housing. Lower wind speeds are shown to the 
south of the eye with several of Darwin’s southern suburbs predicted to have peak wind 
speeds as low as 40 – 45 m/s. The influence of shielding, particularly by housing, is a 
prominent feature that reduces the modelled maximum wind speeds in areas of dense 
housing. This effect is clear in Figure 22, where localised peak velocity minima are evident in 
these regions.  
In general, the predicted wind speeds shown in Figure 22 are as expected. However, there 
are some minor points that may influence localised wind speeds, and therefore – via the 
building vulnerability curves – damage prediction. First and foremost is the fact that a two-
dimensional statistical model, and not an appropriately forced three-dimensional atmospheric 
model, is used to predict the wind field. What this means is that localised changes in the storm 
structure (e.g. deviations from the mean storm path and eye intensity, non-uniformity in the 
wind field around the eye) that may influence patterns of damage are unable to be 
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represented. This is inconsequential when running a long-term risk model to estimate 
exceedance loss statistics; however, when attempting to recreate patterns of loss from a 
particular historical event, this may be a significant problem. In effect, the wind field model 
could miss ‘pockets’ of either high or low winds that were actually present during the real 
event.  
 
 
Source: C Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009. 
Figure 22: Estimated maximum wind speeds for Tracy under 1974 conditions using the 
Geoscience Australia TCRM  
 
A second possible issue is the method used to select peak wind speeds. The approach taken 
was to obtain the maximum near-ground wind speed and direction for each location prior to 
the implementation of any of the multipliers (i.e. shielding, topography, terrain) (C Arthur, pers. 
comm., 29 October 2009). This means that where a non-uniformity exists in the 
circumferential distribution of these factors, there is the potential for an under-estimation of 
peak wind speeds if the chosen direction does not align with the direction of the maximum 
wind speed based on the combined parent wind speed and multipliers. 
A third factor is the model’s handling of shielding. This is a particular problem with intense 
cyclones where strong winds defoliate or destroy vegetation, and in the most severe cases, 
destroy buildings. During Cyclone Tracy, both trees and buildings suffered extreme 
destruction and therefore reductions in numbers. The shielding characteristics of Darwin’s 
suburbs therefore changed significantly throughout the passage of the cyclone. The TCRM 
cannot allow for this temporal change in shielding, and because of this may underestimate the 
building damage.  
The model also does not explicitly account for the impact of flying debris; however, this will to 
a certain extent be moderated for the fact that the vulnerability curves were based on 
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observed damage. An issue with debris impact is that the often localised domino style 
destruction is effectively spread over an entire population of buildings. Again, this may not be 
an issue when running a statistical loss model, but for scenario modelling it means that the 
true spatial distribution of the damage is not reproduced accurately. When running the model 
for present societal conditions, the reduced level of building destruction means the effect of 
this, and the previous issue, will be reduced significantly. 
As in the normalisation method discussed in Section 7.1, wind speed is related to building 
damage through vulnerability curves (Figure 23). For the 1974 scenario, only a single loss 
curve is applied, but given the significant changes made to building design and construction 
since that time, a suite of curves are utilised for the 2008 scenario. 
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Source: Arthur et al. (2008). 
Figure 23: Vulnerability curves used for the scenario loss model. Only the average 
curves were used in the scenario analysis discussed in the text. 
 
The following categories were used for describing the different building types: 
1. pre-1974 construction 
2. repaired and retrofitted 
3. reconstructed 1975–1980, and 
4. post-1980 construction. 
The appropriate assignment of vulnerability curve to an individual structure for the 2008 
scenario was done based on GeoScience Australia’s National Exposure Information System 
(NEXIS), which holds information on building location and age throughout much of the 
country. No sub-category classifications were made (e.g. differing façade or framing systems), 
with age being the single discriminating factor. There are some inherent problems with this 
approach, but generally, once building standards were in place, all constructed buildings – if 
built to those standards – should have been built to essentially fail at a similar threshold wind 
speed, irrespective of the construction type. 
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All curves were developed by a panel of wind engineers during a series vulnerability 
workshops run by GeoScience Australia. Due to the dearth of information relating damage to 
wind speed for all types of building, much of the curve development is based on the 
engineering judgement by the panel, particularly for the damage levels at higher wind speeds. 
This also means there is a high degree of subjectivity, and for this reason upper and lower 
confidence limits were also set for each curve. These are shown in Figure 23 for the pre-1974 
curve. 
Performing the scenario loss calculation for 1974 societal conditions, Figure 24(a) displays the 
predicted damage ratio for each building throughout Darwin. Figure 24(b) is a repeat of Figure 
12, to facilitate easy comparison between the model prediction and post-disaster damage 
survey. Some distinct differences are noted. First, the level of damage predicted for Nightcliff 
and Rapid Creek is significantly over-estimated by the loss model. Arthur et al. (2008) suggest 
that the reason for the high values in this area is proximity to the coastline and hence high 
wind speeds coming off the ocean. This is physically reasonable, but does not explain the 
difference between the two figures. Comparing results for the northernmost suburbs (Nakara, 
Tiwi, Wanguri), the model under-predicts the actual damage. To the south of the eye, the loss 
model generally predicts lower damage values than to the north, but in several localised areas 
over-estimations are observed.  
 
(a) (b) 
Source: C. Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009. 
Figure 24: (a) Scenario loss prediction for damage ratios at each building location 
under 1974 societal conditions, and (b) post-Tracy damage survey results  
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Several reasons may explain the observed difference between the predicted and observed 
damage ratios; however, the most likely contributing factor is the use of a single vulnerability 
curve for all pre-1974 buildings. Just as with post-Tracy buildings, not all these structures 
were identical, and based on the discussion in Section 3.2, this will have influence their 
behaviour under wind loading (e.g. low-set brick homes performed better than elevated 
housing). A single vulnerability curve will systematically over-estimate damage to the more 
resilient structures and under-estimate losses to those less resilient. This is exemplified in 
Figure 25,  where the results of Leicester and Reardon (1976) show the relationship between 
their damage repair index and maximum gust wind speed at a location. A distinct separation is 
seen between elevated and low-set homes.  
 
Source: Leicester & Reardon (1976). 
Figure 25: Relationship between damage repair index and gust velocity at building 
eaves height of a low rise building 
 
Given the discussion in the previous paragraph, it is perhaps more appropriate to consider the 
scenario loss results from an average point of view, hoping that the model’s over- and under-
predictions will even out. There remain issues with taking this approach – for example, it 
assumes that the distribution of housing type is evenly distributed spatially, which is known to 
be untrue. Averaging the damage index over the entire building stock, the model predicts a 
value of 0.35. Taking the same approach to the survey data, a value of 0.56 is obtained. It is 
therefore clear that the loss model under-estimates the true damage.  
Arthur et al. (2008) suggest one of the primary reasons for the model’s overall under-
prediction is the fact that the shielding multiplier does not change with time, thus allowing 
destroyed buildings to continue shielding those downwind. Arthur (pers. comm., 29 October 
2009) also explains that the vulnerability curves used only account for the impact of small-
sized debris, not larger, roof-sized debris, which caused significant damage during Tracy, but 
is perhaps less likely to occur on newer structures. However, the inability of the model to 
capture the structural characteristics of all types of buildings, and also the distribution of these, 
must also play a role. Issues such as loading duration and building orientation are also factors 
that in reality will impact the extent of damage to a given structure but will not be captured by 
the scenario loss model. Moreover, it is unlikely that the loss distribution for a given wind 
speed is symmetrical about the mean curves, and this non-linearity would weight losses 
towards higher values unless the sample size is large enough to recover the mean. In defence 
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of the model, it should be reiterated that these scenario loss calculations were not the primary 
objective for developing TCRM, and few loss models would fare much better. 
Performing the scenario loss analysis for 2008 societal conditions, the Darwin averaged 
damage ratio is calculated as 0.035, with a spatial distribution shown in Figure 26. A simple 
damage ratio comparison shows a drop in averaged damage ratio of 90 per cent. Given that 
the number of buildings and average building value is much greater in 2008, this value does 
not represent a 90 per cent reduction in monetary losses. Arthur et al. (2008) also highlight 
that because of Tracy’s small size and Darwin’s inland spread, many of the newer suburbs 
would not have experienced the full force of the wind. Therefore, to isolate the influence 
improved building standards have had on resilience, only damage ratios for the 1974 footprint 
were compared with damage survey results. In doing this, the averaged damage ratio 
becomes 0.052, a reduction of 85 per cent from the 1974 results. These reductions are 
significant, once again suggesting that the improvements made to the wind loading standard 
would significantly improve the structural performance in the event of a recurrence. 
 
 
Source: C. Arthur, pers. comm., 29 October 2009. 
Figure 26: Damage ratios for 2008 societal conditions 
 
7.3 Implications for evacuation and safety 
Despite some of the counter points concluding the previous section, Walker (G Walker, pers. 
comm., 28 October 2009) agrees that the improvements in building standards since Tracy 
would lead to significant improvements in damage ratios, and considers the 85–90 per cent 
reduction in average damage ratio reasonable. However, Leicester (pers. comm., 3 December 
2009), while agreeing improvements would exist, believes this level of improvement too high, 
attributing this to the continued incorporation of human error in the construction of buildings. 
Irrespective of the value, all interviewees, reports and scholastic material suggest that 
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significantly less damage to buildings would occur if Tracy were to recur today. From an 
emergency management perspective, the improvement in structural resilience is all-important, 
given that one of the primary reasons for evacuating 35 000 residents in the aftermath of 
Tracy was because housing for those who had lost homes could not be provided. However, if 
damage was largely restricted to minor failures, as the predicted 2008 average damage ratios 
shown in Figure 26 suggest (or even if it were doubled or tripled), the majority of housing 
would remain liveable and evacuation would become unnecessary. This statement is made on 
the proviso that power and sanitation could be ensured.  
In relation to life safety and the prevention of injuries, reduced building damage through 
improved standards will also be highly beneficial in minimising the social impact of a 
recurrence of Tracy. Given the discussion in Section 4.5, two of the major causes of injury or 
death during Tracy were asphyxiation due to falling masonry and lacerations from roof 
sheeting as flying debris. In the immediate aftermath, the Darwin Area Building Manual was 
updated to reduce both the loss of roof sheeting (e.g. houses to be designed for full internal 
pressure loading and improved dynamically specified sheet fastenings) and to reduce the risk 
from falling masonry (e.g. internal and external walls to be designed to standards and much 
increased use of reinforced masonry). It can therefore be surmised that if people were to 
shelter in stronger homes, there would be less masonry fall and proportionally fewer 
deaths/injuries due to this and the greater resilience of cladding connections, and the 
specification of full internal pressure loads should proportionally reduce the amount of flying 
debris available for injuring those outside of buildings. Although not directly comparable, the 
more recent occurrence of Cyclone Larry – a marginally weaker event (peak gust at landfall 
estimated at up to 230 km/h (63 m/s)), which impacted an area where at least one-third of 
homes were built using some form of post-Tracy wind-resistant design specification 
(Henderson et al. 2006) – resulted in no fatalities and only approximately 30 reported injuries 
(Emergency Management Australia 2006), which suggests that stronger homes can increase 
life safety. 
7.4 Will structures stand up to a repeat of Tracy? 
This report demonstrates that the wind performance of structures – particularly housing – has 
been significantly improved as a result of building regulations introduced following Cyclone 
Tracy. Geoscience Australia’s scenario analysis (Arthur et al. 2008) suggests an average per 
home reduction in structural damage of approximately 85 per cent from levels observed after 
Tracy. Although this result is gratifying, in the absence of a recurrence of a similar-strength 
event, it is difficult to validate this assertion, and thus far Darwin has been spared such a test. 
However, while the estimated improvement was considered reasonable by experts 
interviewed for the case study, it was acknowledged that human error in construction, 
degradation of structural components over time and the level of certifier efficacy may act to 
reduce this value somewhat.  
Nonetheless, the history of cyclonic impacts from other parts of the country provides some 
confidence in the performance of new construction standards and, in this respect, we compare 
the levels and patterns of damage observed in the Townsville-Innisfail region after cyclones 
Althea in 1971, Winifred in 1986 and Larry in 2006.2 Although these comparisons do not 
include structures built to the standards of the strict post-Tracy Darwin Area Building Manual, 
they provide a conservative estimate of the improvements made in Darwin – that is, 
construction improvements in Darwin are expected to be better because of the large number 
of structures built during the Darwin reconstruction.  
Of these events, Cyclone Althea made landfall prior to any stringent regulation of cyclone or 
building provisions for housing construction; Cyclone Winifred made landfall approximately 
five years after wind-resistant housing regulations were mandated in Queensland; and 
Cyclone Larry occurred another 20 years later. Peak three-second gust wind speeds for 
Cyclones Althea and Winifred were approximately 55 m/s, while Larry is estimated at 65 m/s. 
Comparing the area-wide proportion of structures that suffered ‘significant damage’ during 
Althea and Winifred, James Cook University (1972) and Reardon et al. (1986) found a 
                                                     
2 Further examples for Western Australia can be found in Boughton & Falck (2007) and Reardon et al. (1999) for 
Cyclones George and Vance and for the Northern Territory in Henderson & Leitch (2005) for Cyclone Ingrid. 
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reduction from approximately 15 per cent to 5 per cent. Reardon et al. (1986) highlight the 
structural improvement to both modern (1982–86, after the introduction of cyclone resistant 
specification in the Queensland building code) and old buildings (pre-1982) during Winifred, 
and suggests: 
This [improvement in wind resistance] can be attributed to improvements in the 
fastening of the roof cladding of older buildings undertaken since Althea and 
the much better performance of houses built in accordance with the new 
cyclone resistant building regulations. 
Reardon et al. (1986) continues, 
An obvious example of the difference in performance of modern and older 
houses was evident at Kurrimine Beach where, within approximately one 
kilometre, there are a group of houses 15 to 20 years old and another group of 
modern houses. It is estimated that significant damage occurred to 20–30% of 
those older houses whereas the modern ones had damage restricted to failure 
of attachments such as guttering, awnings, etc. – i.e. structural damage to the 
main fabric of the houses was almost non-existent. 
The impact of the use of an engineering-based housing wind standard is clearly evident. The 
almost nil structural damage to modern housing is a major improvement, and its performance 
is in line with expectation given the predicted peak wind gust was 10–15 m/s below the wind 
speed these homes were built to withstand. 
Similar improvements in structural performance were seen during Larry, where approximately 
17 per cent of pre-1985 housing (some of which had been renovated) suffered significant 
damage, whereas only approximately 7 per cent of post-1985 structures did so (Henderson et 
al. 2006). For the newer buildings, Henderson et al. (2006) concludes that in the cases where 
significant damage occurred, it was generally through inappropriate application of wind 
standard specifications and not a technical deficiency in the standard itself. This again points 
to the fact that the wind standard is doing its job.  
For older buildings affected by Larry, degradation/corrosion of members and joints, as well as 
roof cladding and structural issues observed during Tracy (Mason and Haynes 2010), were 
causative factors in failure. While the repeat of structural/cladding failures in non-renovated 
housing is unsurprising, the significance of corrosion highlights the importance of considering 
structural decay over time, and not just considering strength at the time of construction.  
Avoiding decay types of failures can only be achieved through smart material choices at the 
time of construction, and regular inspection and maintenance activities throughout the life of a 
structure. It is our recommendation that serious consideration be given to the implementation 
of a lifetime inspection and maintenance program for buildings in cyclone regions. A program 
such as this should require compulsory participation, given that the implications of structural 
failure are not localised, but dispersed to surrounding buildings due to the cascading effect of 
flying debris. These are public safety issues, and should be dealt with accordingly. Mandated 
structural inspection at the point of sale may go some way towards achieving this result. 
One positive solution to structural degradation is renovation and retrofit. Henderson (2006) 
highlights the positive influence retrofitting had on the structural performance of roofing during 
Larry. In this event, roofing on pre-1965 houses outperformed those on structures built 
between 1965 and 1985. This improvement occurred because of the higher number of 
renovated roofs – often done for aesthetic or general maintenance reasons – on these homes. 
Since renovations were built to comply with current structural design standards, they provided 
greater structural resilience than older roofing construction on newer homes.  
It would be wrong, however, to rely solely on this natural approach to renewal, given that 
renovation often only addresses the weakness in one part of the structural system – say the 
roof – and does not imply an upgrade of the entire structural load path. In strong events, such 
an oversight may have the effect of simply moving the failure point further along the structural 
resistance chain.  
The result of allowing structures to degrade has public safety ramifications. Mandated lifetime 
inspections would address this point, and could be used to identify homes that require 
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substantial retrofit or renovation. The financing of any such works would be an issue that will 
require further analysis and debate. 
So will structures stand up to a repeat of Tracy? In short, yes. Wind-resistant standards have 
significantly improved since Tracy, and the application of these standards to housing 
construction has led to a step change in the level of safety these structures provide. All 
housing constructed since Tracy should maintain structural integrity in the event of a cyclone 
of the same strength if built and maintained to current standards. Evacuation therefore 
becomes a secondary consideration and, provided surge is not an issue, the primary focus 
during cyclonic events should be to ensure people are safely inside their homes or 
workplaces. 
8. Climate change, tropical cyclones and adaptation 
Thus far, we have considered the success (or otherwise) of the adaptive response to Cyclone 
Tracy in the context of an ‘unchanged’ climate. But moving forward, adaptive responses and 
subsequent measures will need to consider the risks associated with a changing climate. In 
this section, we consider the evidence that indicates the risk of increased or changed cyclone 
activity in the future as well as the trade-off between risks and costs that will need to be 
included in developing adaptation responses to climate change predictions. 
8.1 Cyclone risk under climate change 
A significant signal-to-noise problem exists for detection of an anthropogenic signal against 
large-amplitude variations in the background activity of tropical cyclones, so it should come as 
no surprise that modelling studies have struggled to find an unequivocal signal with the results 
varying between basins and models (Knutson et al. 2010). The most recent down-scaling 
studies, based on the ensemble mean of 18 global climate change projections (Bender et al. 
2010), point to an increase in the strength of the most intense cyclones and a decrease in 
frequency overall by the end of the twenty-first century. The CSIRO’s document Climate 
Change in Australia: Technical Report 2007 (<http://www.climatechangeinaustralia.gov.au>) 
takes a similar view for Australia; however, as has been shown by Bender et al. (2010), 
projections of future cyclone activity vary widely according to the Global Climate Model used 
to set the boundary conditions under enhanced CO2 conditions. We certainly expect the 
incidence of meteorological hazards to change with increasing global temperatures, but the 
exact manner in which these changes may play out in terms of cyclonic activity for Australia is 
currently speculative. 
Despite uncertainty as to the future impact of climate change on wind speed, increasing 
weather-related natural disaster losses have been well documented (e.g. Munich Re 2007; 
Swiss Re 2010). This result is unequivocal. A recent focus of research has been the question 
as to whether or not an anthropogenic climate change signal is manifest in these records. 
After adjusting for various changes (population, wealth, inflation and building codes) known to 
have influenced the loss records, a process called loss normalisation, no study has yet been 
able to detect an anthropogenic signal across a range of natural perils including tropical 
cyclones and different jurisdictions (e.g. Pielke & Landsea, 1998; Pielke et al. 2008; Crompton 
& McAneney 2008; Crompton et al. 2010; Barredo 2009 and 2010). 
Bender et al. (2010) suggest that it may be 60 or more years before any significant climate 
change signal is manifested in terms of cyclone activity, and thus we would expect that it 
might take significantly longer than this before any similar signal becomes evident in disaster 
losses. This being the case, the most appropriate means for reducing losses due to natural 
hazards come firmly back to the choices society makes about where people build and how 
homes are constructed. From a public policy perspective, if we are serious about reducing 
disaster losses, then we need better risk-informed land planning decisions and strong building 
codes. Any gains achieved in these areas significantly improve our position for both future 
extreme weather arising from climate change and natural causes. This point highlights why 
the improved construction standards that emerged from the experience of Cyclone Tracy are 
so important, and why these have been the primary focus of this report. 
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8.2 Trade-off between cost and risk 
The issue of appropriate design wind speeds is a joint engineering/public policy issue, and 
should be dealt with (and funded) as such. The most appropriate people to determine suitable 
return periods (recurrence intervals) for specific wind speeds are engineers and 
meteorologists. However, societal impacts of what wind speed to use for design are an issue 
that has public implications and must be addressed in the public domain. At present, this 
responsibility is upheld by the working committee for the wind standard, determining 
recurrence intervals, and the Australian Building Codes Board, determining the recurrence 
interval to use for design.  
Given the public implications of inappropriately determining the wind speed–recurrence 
interval relationship, it seems sensible for at least some funding for its determination and 
update to come from the public purse. Funding of a five-yearly review of cyclonic wind speed 
utilising up-to-date observational data and modelling techniques seems appropriate. A 
detailed peer review of analysis and prediction techniques should be required, with publication 
in international journals recommended. 
A further issue of importance is that the return period quoted in the wind standard or the 
Building Code of Australia is the return period for a gust wind speed measured at a single 
point. This is quite different from the return period of a given wind speed for an area, such as 
a city. It is the latter that is of more interest to emergency planners developing disaster plans 
for a particular area. Homeowners are concerned primarily with the probability of their homes 
being affected, whereas the State Emergency Services are interested in the risk to the 
community. This is a consideration for all natural hazards, with the most relevant risk measure 
depending upon perspective and responsibilities; the likelihood of a certain level of property 
damage by bushfire to Marysville is different from the risk to the whole of Victoria and different 
again to the risk to the nation. 
To pursue this line of argument, let’s examine, for example, the hypothetical case of cyclones 
impacting a given town. If on average a cyclone impacts the town every ten years, but only 
affects half the town each time it hits, then the return period for cyclones impacting the town is 
ten years. If the impact location within the town were randomly distributed, then the return 
period of the impact at any given location would be 20 years – that is, assuming on average 
only every second cyclone impacts a given point.  
It is therefore evident that the risk of the peak winds within a cyclone hitting any part of a city 
is greater than the risk that it will hit a given structure within that city. The risk relationship 
between a point in space and area is non-trivial and dependent on the area under 
consideration, local topography, land cover, and regional cyclone frequency and structure. 
Which wind speed on the wind speed–return period curve is most appropriate is again a public 
policy issue and must be considered by state and local authorities. A continued review and 
publishing of area-wide return period information, as with the point risk, should be pursued for 
at-risk areas of the country. This could be done relatively simply by those who conduct the 
former (point risk) work. 
In our view, building codes and more risk-informed decision-making in relation to land 
planning are among the key adaptation policy options available to government under 
scenarios of climate change, if this country is serious about reducing losses from natural 
disasters. Such adaptations will also provide community resilience in respect of any 
aggravation of cyclones arising from the uncertain impacts of global climate change. In this 
respect, the Tracy case study is important in illustrating just how effective the engineering 
response was and how this response will avoid the need for a future evacuation of Darwin, 
given the recurrence of a cyclone of similar intensity. There are precious few examples in this 
country where we can claim to have learnt from a disaster in a similar manner.  
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Glossary
Report-specific terms 
Average recurrence interval. See Return period.
Cyclone factor. Factors of safety applied to the design wind speed in modern wind standards 
to account for uncertainty in the calculation of these wind gusts at long return periods. 
Extreme value analysis. Statistical method for describing extreme geophysical variables 
based on one or more of the three extreme value distributions identified by Fisher 
and Tippett (1928). 
Eye (in relation to eye of the cyclone). Roughly circular region of predominantly calm weather 
at the centre of a tropical cyclone. 
Gust wind speed. The greatest expected (or measured) three-second average wind speed 
over a predefined period. 
Limit state design approach. A rational approach to the design of structures where the 
ultimate and serviceability limits are defined (after Holmes 2001). The serviceability 
limit is the level beyond which a structure, while maintaining structural integrity, will 
be unfit for occupation. Ultimate limit refers to the level beyond which a structure is 
structurally unsound. 
Normalised insurance loss. Reported insured losses adjusted to account for current societal 
conditions. Factors included in the adjustment are, changes to the number of 
occupied dwellings, changes in the average value of dwellings and changes to the 
strength of structures due to improvements in building standards. 
Permissible stress design. Engineering design approach where stresses due to the 
application of working loads, including factors of safety, are designed to remain below 
a limit that would cause permanent deformity of a structure or system.  
Racking failure. Failure that occurs in walls parallel to the wind direction due to lack of in-
plane bracing. 
Retrofit/retrofitting. Repairing or upgrading of an existing structure to increase its resistance 
to a specific loading. 
Return period. The average time period between exceedances of a given intensity threshold 
(e.g. average time between gust wind speeds exceeding a specific value at a given 
location). Mathematically, the return period is the inverse of the probability that a 
threshold will be exceeded within a given time period. For design wind speeds, return 
periods are generally given in years; thus an event that has a probability of 
exceedance of 0.01 in any one year has a corresponding return period of 100 years. 
Return period is interchangeable with average recurrence interval (ARI). 
Saffir-Simpson scale. A tropical cyclone scale used in some regions to describe the intensity 
of the sustained winds within a storm. The scale was developed to provide a sliding 
scale of damage potential for hurricanes, including that arising from storm surge 
(<http://cawcr.gov.au/bmrc/pubs/tcguide/ch9/ch9_5.htm>). 
Shielding (in regards to shielding characteristics and shielding multiplier). The phenomenon 
where an object (e.g. a true or a building) ‘shields’ a downwind building from the full 
force of the wind. This process is accounted for in design practice by the application 
of shielding multipliers that reduce required design loads when shielding objects that 
exist upwind of a building. 
Translational speed. The forward speed of a cyclone, the speed at which a cyclone or other 
system moves. 
Zone accumulation method. Method used by insurance companies for determining the 
maximum loss for a given area (e.g. Darwin) for which coverage should be bought. 
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General adaptation-related terms 
Adaptation. Actions taken to avoid actual or anticipated impacts from climate change, or to 
attain potential benefits arising from climate change. Action taken in light of an event or 
the emergence of new information to avoid an undesirable outcome. 
Adaptive capacity. The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate 
variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of 
opportunities or to cope with the consequences. This is also applicable in the case 
where ‘extreme’ is redefined by the occurrence of a previously unexpected event. 
Resilience. The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining 
the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation 
and the capacity to adapt to stress and change.This statement is equally applicable to 
buildings – but of course a building can’t change on its own. 
Vulnerability. The degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, 
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. 
Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate change and 
variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity. This is 
also true for buildings, but climate change is not the only reason buildings and 
communities are vulnerable. Poor construction, building standards, council regulation 
and lifetime decay (to name a few issues) also contribute to the built environment. 
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Appendix 1: Wind maps 
This appendix displays the different wind maps used in successive wind loading standards for 
determination of design wind speeds at a point location within Australia. Wind speeds given in 
Figures A1.1 to A1.3 are 50-year return period three-second gusts at an elevation of 10 m, 
while those given in Figure A1.4 are 1000-year return period winds. Compilation and supply of 
all figures was by Dr John Holmes (J Holmes, pers. comm., 20 January 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure A1.1: AS CA34 Part 2, 1971 
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Figure A1.2: AS1170 Part 2, 1973 
 
Figure A1.3: AS1170 Part 2, 1975 (remained the same for 1981 revision) 
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Figure A1.4: AS1170 Part 2, 1989 
 
Figure A1.5: AS1170 Part 2, 2002 
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Appendix 2: CSIRO damage survey information 
This appendix outlines some the information used to determine damage repair indices for the 
CSIRO damage survey analysis, Table A2.1 and A2.2. The routes through Darwin used by the 
survey team are also shown in the figures below (B Leicester, pers. comm., 2 December 
2009). 
 
Table A2.1: Damage definitions for residential buildings  
Source: Leicester & Reardon (1976). 
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Table A2.2: Damage definitions for steel industrial buildings  
 
Source: Leicester & Reardon (1976). 
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Figure A2.1: Survey routes through the southern suburbs of Darwin 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Survey routes through the central suburbs of Darwin 
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Figure A2.3: Survey routes through the northern suburbs of Darwin 
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